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Charles Brockden Brown’s American Gothic is distinctly American in its dealings with 
Revolutionary-era culture and distinctly Gothic in its critique of the nascent cultural identity and 
political environment that would emerge. The way in which he gothicizes elements of the 
American socio-political identity through identifying cultural (during the revolution) and partisan 
(in post-revolution early America) contradictions is indicative of Brown’s vast breadth of 
historical perspective and self-consciousness, which makes his works of gothic fiction 
anticipatory to many subsequent philosophies of the modern age. What facilitates Brown’s work 
is the converging of present, “real” society—as he saw it—against the prevalent idealisms of his 
time, and when viewing American history “self-consciously,” or objectively, he finds the present 
is ignorant of the past, and therefore contradictory to these idealisms in the underlying presence 
of repeated transgressions. Mark L. Kamrath paraphrases Brown’s own historical notions, 
 “If the historian, writes Brown, is one who will write of ‘the noises, the sights, and the 
smells that attend the eruption of Vesuvius, what is known by the testimony of our 
senses’—he or she depends on linking facts or events together by circumstance and the 
‘evidence of others,’ evidence that can never be linked to certainty…the writer of history 
is a ‘dealer. Not in certainties, but probabilities, and is therefore a romancer…In this 
respect, suggests Brown, the barrier between ‘history’ and the ‘novel’ as narrative forms 
evaporates and is permeable” (Kamrath 85). 
 Brown’s gothic fiction makes use of history, specifically forgotten or ignored lineages of 
ideas and philosophies, in its ultimate critique of political ideology and the effect on the 
American individual.  He achieves this most completely and directly in his final gothic work 
Edgar Huntly, but all of his works of gothic fiction leading up to the publication of Edgar Huntly 






He draws upon his own revolutionary experience, which is extremely unique—yet again, 
distinctly American considering historical context—first in the novel Wieland to connect, and 
then criticize, two main tenents of the transatlantic migration of seemingly opposite ideologies to 
America. These are radical German-Protestant theology and rationalistic political and socio-
economic philosophies associated with the Enlightenment.1 Brown creates an obvious duality 
between the two opposing spheres through the common thread of “seeking illumination,” or in 
other words, making assertions about ultimate truths—truths about man and society. He will 
include other cultural and ideological contradictions under this theme of contradictory dualism, 
such as the two respective spheres’ New-World optimism.2 The Quakers and other radical 
Protestant “seeking” sects sought in America a haven, a place to start a fresh from corrupt 
European society.3 The Enlightened revolutionaries, people like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas 
Paine, expressed in their revolutionary politics the main points of liberty and freedom through 
republican rhetoric, all connoting traces of utopian sentiment—derived from the classical 
republican principle of civic virtue—regarding the society of the new America.4 Furthermore, he 
alludes to the fact that while both express these classical principles they nonetheless share an 
                                                          
1 Charles Brockden Brown was born a Quaker in a 
prominent Philadelphia Quaker family. His lineage 
consisted of many Quaker “visionaries,” those 
religiously motivated towards seeking illumination 
through visions and divine intuition. However, his 
father, Elijah Brown, was motivated by mercantile 
capitalism and was renounced by the Philadelphia 
Quaker council. Peter Kafer successfully describes 
the dichotomy of these spheres of influence on 
Brown’s perspective of the Revolution in Chapter 4, 
Sins of Fathers, of his book, Charles Brockden 
Brown’s Revolution and the Birth of the American 
Gothic.  
2 Mark L. Kamrath writes about various revolutionary 
historical misconceptions about American identity. 
On one hand revolutionaries and patriots believed in 
the exceptionalism of American Republicanism and 
on the other the religiously motivated populations 
believed American to be a moral utopia, a divine 
providence.  
3 Peter Kafer, Chapter 1, Children of the Light 
4 Peter Kafer, Chapter 3, Revolutionary 
Reverberations, in reference to John Locke’s political 
philosophy and the idea of a realistic and feasible 






undercurrent of economic individualism. His perception of these contradictions—specific to 
America in the 1790s—drive Brown’s gothic fiction, which exposes the self-blindness of both 
Federalist and Jeffersonian Republicans, in whose apparently opposite visions of an American 
future he detects a common disabling force.  
Scholarship on Charles Brockden Brown and the American Gothic seems to, indeed, be 
interested in his personal experiences portrayed throughout his novels and what insights he may 
have for us on pre- and post-revolution America, but it also seems to be missing a larger picture. 
This larger picture is that an unlikely kinship can be traced through certain veins of Marxist 
ideological theory to its early progenitor in Antione Destutt de Tracy in the time of the French 
Revolution. Brown’s work predates Tracy’s, but evidence of a strong Trans-Atlantic connection 
between European and American post-revolution socio-politics is well established. So even if 
Brown was not directly influenced by Tracy, the latter’s work on ideology has clear parallels to 
some of Brown’s gothic allusions, and serves as a convenient theoretical point for making sense 
of the issues of ideology and contradiction that Brown was weaving into his gothic plotlines.  
If the essence of Gothicism is a sense of cultural subversion, Brown’s work realizes this 
through a clear combination of juxtapositions and contradictions in American culture. Amid 
works that mostly express either the optimism of Jefferson’s agrarian utopia or the pessimism 
towards the “American Experiment” taken up by Federalists in support of their arguments of 
more traditionally European centralized government and emphasis on strong international fronts 
that anticipates and aligns with the coming ages of European imperialism and colonialism, 
Charles Brockden Brown is among the few to view American history objectively and self-






democratic process’ proneness to manipulation.1 Perhaps the most direct allusion to his historical 
stance is in the novel Edgar Huntly, after Clithero tells Edgar Huntly his tale of accidental 
murder and mishaps, he says, referring to the gothic sublimity of the American wilderness, “This 
scene is adapted to my temper. Its mountainous asperities supply me with images of desolation 
and seclusion, and its headlong streams lull me into temporary forgetfulness of mankind” 
(Brown 66). Furthermore, Edgar Huntly responds to his story, “I had heard a tale which 
apparently related scenes and persons far distant…what should hinder but that the death of my 
friend was, in a like manner, an act of momentary insanity and originated in a like spirit of 
mistaken benevolence.” In light of his critical historical stance, the words “temporary 
forgetfulness of mankind” and “insanity originating in a spirit of mistaken benevolence” carry a 
particular weight of foreboding, especially in the context of Edgar Huntly in which the two 
murder arcs echo each other from across the sea.  It is clear that Brockden Brown means to 
invoke certain integral aspects of the American political unconscious. 
Brown’s ideas regarding culture and politics can be traced first through his Quaker 
origins which instilled in him the drive to search for ultimate truth, then to his formative years 
during and after the American Revolution when he would witness American identity and culture 
founded on the acceptance of various false truths.2 He, therefore, often places characters 
representing his familial history in a larger historical environment where transatlantic political 
                                                          
1 Mark L. Kamrath’s introduction to, the Historicism 
of Charles Brockden Brown, arguing the significance 
of Brown’s work lies in his aptitude as historian. 
2 This is the point at which Marxist theory will 
become applicable as the recognition of “false 
truths” for Brown, to the modern reader amounts to 
ideals and ideology masking the capitalist divisions 






philosophy can be criticized through obvious congruency to Protestant Mysticism—as a main 
tenent of enlightened philosophy was to disassociate philosophy from theology.1  Later, his 
membership in the “Friendly Society” would introduce him to Godwinian theory, which 
indulged his political nihilism while still preserving his religiously inspired commitment to truth. 
These aforementioned false truths of revolutionary republicanism came to be common 
among Federalist criticism of the revolutionary popularity of Jefferson, yet Brown is no clear 
Federalist. He is critical of both prominent spheres—the Jeffersonian model for its continuation 
of the utopian falsity, and the Federalist one for not acknowledging its lineage and position of 
power to those condemned revolutionary “false truths”—and the ultimate, subtle insinuation 
being a sense of latent economic individualism and ideological manipulation.  
Again, drawing on his own revolutionary experience, and most explicitly displayed in his 
work Arthur Mervyn, Brown seems to be aligning himself with Godwinian rationalism expressed 
in William Godwin’s Political Justice, as was the case with many small intellectual clubs 
springing up among American elites2. Certainly Brown, in his noting of American tendency 
towards ignorance of dualistic ideological contradictions, seems to be invoking the Godwinian 
claim that spheres of influence—most specifically those of governing bodies—are in themselves 
the cause of socially inherent and incentivized corruption through the manufactured environment 
of individual human competition.3 While this is perhaps a fine assertion in the case of Brown’s 
early novels, his later works show deeper and more culturally immersive subversion tactics. For 
                                                          
1 William Turner’s History of Philosophy, Chapter 53, 
Systems of Political Philosophy 
2 Peter Kafer, Chapter 5, The Anti-Godwin, before 
explaining Brown’s theoretical split from Godwinian 
rationalism, Kafer describes the initial enthusiasm 
for it, which resulted in Brown authoring Arthur 
Mervyn. 
3 William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political 






he recognizes Godwin’s radical rationalism as yet another ideology and as such a sphere of 
influence in it of itself. Most importantly, however, is that Brown recognizes Godwin’s 
theoretical anarchy to be essentially as naively optimistic and idealistic as the Enlightened-era 
schools it had radicalized from.1 Again, Federalist pessimism stands in clear opposition, a 
seemingly attractive school of thought for Brown in terms of denying foolish optimism, but 
given the Federalist counter-mission of centralization and international prowess, it seems the 
institutional mistrust of Godwin resonates with Brown, even if his anarchic optimism does not. It 
appears Brown’s real issue in his recognition of these blind contradictions with Godwin, the 
Protestant migration, and with the bipartisan system, then becomes an issue of questioning that 
most basic ideal of truth, instilled in him from his Quaker youth by the idealized search for 
illumination. Consequently, he criticizes through gothic fiction but does little to offer in way of a 
solution himself, as the “truth,” in Brown’s American Gothic is always shrouded and those 
characters adhering to truths, almost without exception, are revealed to be severely misguided.   
Brown’s later works clearly evince his disillusionment with Godwinian theory. Ormond, 
for example, as Peter Kafer puts it, “is about post-Revolutionary Philadelphia society and, in 
particular, about what an unfeeling, heartless place it was for those truly in need. It is about 
divergence between rhetoric and reality, between a societies’ stated moral codes and the actual 
way people behave. It’s about hypocrisy” (Kafer 164). A Marxist approach to his later works 
reveal Brown to be expressing similar sentiments to Louis Althusser’s work on Ideology. The 
thread of ideological recognition and subversion in Brown’s work, contextualized through 
                                                          
1 Peter Kafer notes in Chapter 5, The Anti-Godwin, 
that Brown would eventually come to portray his 
Godwinian characters, Ludloe and Ormond, as 
condemning of institutions except when they serve 






Tracy’s “Ideology,” can be applied specifically to his struggle with the concept of truth. Indeed, 
Althusser defines ideology as, “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence,”1 and so Brown, being a writer, historian, and political philosopher in one of the 
most important and tumultuous cities of post-revolution America, in terms of its capitalist well-
being—Philadelphia—while being also a man born into a family of Quaker “visionaries,” is in 
many ways the most likely man to come to a similar realization or exasperation with ideologies.  
One could say the fracturing of this truthful hope begins with his understanding of the 
transatlantic movement of ideas—for Brown this is radical Protestantism and Enlightened 
Political Philosophy—informing what would become American philosophical identity. The two 
are opposites—both professing an ideological truth—and yet seem to operate in the turning cogs 
of the American machine cooperatively. And so, from one cultural extreme to another, from the 
radical spiritualism of the Quakers to the radical rationalism of Godwinian philosophy, Brown 
uncovers a cultural discord of unwitting dualities among American revolutionary and post-
revolutionary society. What his American Gothic ultimately suggests is an intellectual 
exasperation with ideologies purporting to be ultimate truths, and his novels, often described as 
ambiguous and complex, with uncertain plots and misleading information, are therefore obvious 
reactions to the naiveté of ultimate truths, especially regarding society and politics. The 
intimations that embody the socio-political subtext of Brown’s work hold far greater significance 
by undermining the validity of ideals that would legitimize certain American mythologies—such 
                                                          
1 Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Norton 






as American Exceptionalism contained both in the Jeffersonian promise of internal prosperity 
and in the opposing Federalist ideal of America as a strong international power.    
The Marxists, Lukács and Althusser tackle this issue of contradiction vs. cooperation, 
duality vs. dichotomy, with their critique of the capitalist usage of ideology. Brown’s work lines 
up with a similar take, in particular, of the strong ideological holds on American’s individuality.1 
It makes sense, in the vein of Gothic subversion, then, that Brown aligns with the later Marxists 
in terms of ideology as his American Gothic deals with subverting the pseudo-utopian sentiments 
of nascent capitalism in a burgeoning, post-revolution America, and the consequent blind 
contradictions of the bipartisan political system.  
Here it may be conceptually useful to refer to the example of Henry St. John, 1st Viscount 
Bolingbroke, as an English political philosopher whose ideas were widely influential in 
establishing the republican zeal of American revolutionaries. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson 
are said to have been influenced by his staunch opposition to corruption, but objectively what is 
at the heart of Bolingbroke’s work is the notion that corruption in English society spawned from 
the financial revolution and the increased emphasis and development of banking and credit.2 
Bolingbroke saw England’s Augustan Age after the social change of the financial revolution as 
“the demise of what he considered to have been the traditional political and social structure 
firmly entrenched since the days of the Tudors” (Kramnick 5).  The Federalists would use this as 
support for their return to tradition and pessimism in the way of the radical republican 
experiment, but historically, they are again based in contradiction as Bolingbroke viewed the 
                                                          
1 Althusser states in Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses, that ideology functions by recruiting or 
“interpellating” the individual, thus transforming 
them into subjects 
2 Bolingbroke and his Circle by Isaac Kramnick, 







new era of socio-politics in England as “politics of administration and manipulation that 
contributed generously to the total degradation of public life…” (Kramnick 6). The Brownian 
assumption is that the Federalist model truly resembles this Augustan age of financial motivation 
of “behind the scenes manipulation of interests and ambitions,” but joined with its opposition in 
Bolingbroke’s ideal of “noble gentlemen who win support by virtue of their eloquence and the 
compelling aesthetic force of their rhetoric…in order to perform the governmental roles of 
statecraft properly, one had to be properly bred” (Kramnick 6), with the Federalist ideal of a 
political aristocracy.  It is appropriate in this way, then, that the progenitor of the American 
Gothic is among few contemporaries to adopt an objective and subsequently critical view of 
American history, As Lukács says,  
“A real popular revolution never breaks out as a result of a single, isolated social 
contradiction. The objective-historical period preparatory to revolution is filled with a 
whole number of tragic contradictions in life itself. The maturing of the revolution then 
shows with increasing clarity the objective connection between these isolatedly occurring 
contradictions…and in some ways certain social contradictions can continue unresolved 
even after a revolution or, indeed, emerge strengthened and heightened as a result of the 
revolution” (Lukács 227).  
For Brown, with regard to his personal experience and the intellectual environment of his 
time, this is not merely a critique of contemporary society but of the realization that “truth” and 
its subsequent value systems are useful to spheres of influence. This informs his critique of the 
political environment in the 1790s, as one that involved using theories of the advancement of the 
common citizen to ultimately serve an underlying reality of individualistic-capitalism.  As 






strengthened or heightened, allusions of ideological suspicion in Brown’s work seem to almost 
anticipate the climate of France after its revolution and Napoleon’s reinstatement of European 
imperialism as simply a more obvious example of these social contradictions emerging 
strengthened, and mirroring the political environment of America after its revolution. The 
gothicizing of the American political environment is completed with the eerie sense the reader 
observes in the plot of Brown’s last gothic work, Edgar Huntly; the extremely coincidental, 
almost supernatural, aligning of random events pertaining to Edgar’s perspective of social 
relations can be read as a proto-Marxist take on ideology as the insights from his experience 
connotes the distinct notion of uncertain manipulation of some kind.  
Brown’s gothic tactics, beginning in Wieland and being completed in Edgar Huntly, 
allow him to include the divine providence and moral rigidity of radical Protestantism; the 
Jeffersonian Republican model of an agricultural utopia; the shades of more traditional, 
European-mercantile traits shown by the post-Revolutionary Federalist government; and even the 
ideas of instinctual human compassion as it exists outside of society asserted by radical 
Godwinian rationalism, in a total subversive representation of American ideological failure. 
Played out among Brown’s seemingly obscure representative communities, they all prove fatally 
unworkable at the expense of those citizens whose advancement they were meant to promote.  
  
Part 1: Wieland, and Charles Brockden Brown’s Metahistorical Narrative 
 Charles Brown and his American Gothic are in opposition to a wave of realism that arose 
with the early novel and is associated with the certain elements of the radical Enlightenment. 
Jonathan Israel notes the psychological roots of radical thought in the Enlightenment lay in pride, 






of justification.1 These early American works, often derivative of the preceding popularity of the 
epistolary novel, were works of fiction that attempted to mirror reality.2 America’s development 
is highly connected to enlightened thoughts and its history of tradition does not, at first, seem to 
lend itself to the Gothic genre as Europe’s does. In Development of American Romance, David 
Michael Bell says, “early American values saw reading and writing imaginative fiction as 
dangerous to society” (Bell 121), and therefore, as gothic works generally invoke traditional and 
cultural historical elements it is interesting then that the American gothic as a newly formed 
entity must look to some kind of past, and Brown objectively locates it in America’s European 
roots,3 and in the questioning of prevalent rationality or assumptive reality. 
 Brown’s first work to be applicable to the genre of the American Gothic is Wieland; or 
The Transformation, An American Tale (1798). In Wieland, he begins his dissection of the two 
formative ideologies of Protestant mysticism and enlightened political philosophy. Through the 
guise of a family history of migration from “old” to “new” worlds, he alludes to American 
history, cleverly incorporating the familial symbolism in an act of joining the two opposing 
ideologies, similarly related by a kind of family history. In identifying these points, Brown 
begins to question the legitimacy of the burgeoning “American Identity,”—be it Federalist or 
Jeffersonian, both could be said to be based in different approaches to materialism and individual 
capitalism in the 1790s—by reminding readers of the earlier version of American ideology 
(classical republicanism unconsciously supported by Protestant “illumination” theology) that 
existed before and during the revolution, and how it was so easily overwritten. He does so by 
                                                          
1 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment, Chapter 3, 
Society, Institutions, Revolution 
2 Ian Watt, Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, 
Richardson, and Fielding, from Theory of the Novel 
3 This connects Brown’s Gothicism to his German 
Protestant heritage; he Trans-Atlantic migration of 
Protestant sects is expanded upon in Chapter 4, Sins 






being among the first American writers to view American history, as Mark L. Kamrath puts it, 
“self-consciously.”  
Simply put, in Wieland, Brown probes the ultimate truths being professed by both 
revolutionary ideologies, using similar language (“illumination”), to describe the palpability of 
their sentiments to a utopian “fresh start” in the New World and identify these certain integral 
“Old World” ties and kinship to one another.1 Viewing history self-consciously for Brown thus is 
a process of tracing lineages of thought and the familial histories of ideas; both connote an 
ultimate idealism of America. All the while the truth of the matter, remains that this very 
idealism is grounded in a contradiction of two opposing truths. The two coexist in a cooperative 
duality, and therefore their opposition is contradictory. This neat, gothic construct can then be 
viewed itself as a symbol or representation, used in the broader historical allusion of the different 
political stances and immediate goals of the two emergent parties of late eighteenth century.  
Theodore Wieland believes in the professed certainty of things, and he knowingly 
champions both Protestant mysticism and enlightened political philosophies while viewing them 
separately. He ultimately ignores that he is shaped by both, so he represents them dichotomously. 
His sister Clara, the novel’s narrator, is aware of both rational and superstitious reactions 
available to her when experiencing unexplainable events but is forever in doubt. In many ways, 
her character is the most confusing to deal with because she can be seen as representing different 
sentiments of this ideological allusion at different times, but what can indeed be safely said of 
her is that she is unsure of even her own self—her own mind and senses—due to an 
                                                          
1 Brown, at times, seems to vaguely ponder 
theoretical territory later expounded upon by Roland 
Barthes, in Mythologies, as he constructs the post-
structuralist idea of all spheres of Western thought 
being incorporated together in a self-serving system 






understanding of her family’s history and perhaps a suppressed but unrelenting anxiety towards 
it.  
 It is Charles Brockden Brown’s unique experience with regards to various aspects of 
early American society and thought that makes him the perfect writer for the first American 
Gothic, but it is his competence as a historian that informs his initial recognition of contradiction. 
It is the understanding of his family history and the history of revolutionary sparks, an 
understanding of the Trans-Atlantic movement of ideas. Brown is “historically self-conscious,” 
because his gothic fiction, particularly the dark implications of familial lineage included within 
Weiland, spearheads criticism, “challenging metanarratives about historical 
objectivity…including the manipulation of democratic processes for political purposes and 
power” (Kamrath xiv). 1 
 In Wieland, he does this by joining the history of Protestant mysticism and its migration 
with his own familial history, resulting in his gothic tale, driven by the heavily connotative “sins 
of the father” theme. Indeed, Peter Kafer notes that at the time of the Elder Wieland’s demise, 
Clara Wieland would have been the same age as Brown when his own father was exiled from 
Philadelphia. However, the stronger allusion is to his Quaker lineage and its place in the history 
of the migration of radical Protestant theology.  
William Turner in his History of Philosophy, said that the, “fullest expression of all 
mystical tendencies of Protestantism can be found in the writing of Jakob Boehme” (Turner 
439). Boehme’s work during majority of the eighteenth century would have been rarely read, 
other than by occultists, but the disdain of being linked with Boehme at the time, the irrationality 
                                                          
1 Mark L. Kamrath, The Historicism of Charles 






described of his work, is exactly the kind of deep cultural contradiction that Brown’s gothic 
invokes and reflects onto reality. Boehme, writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
taught of the eternal dualism of God, that all is known by its opposite.1 As Turner puts it, 
“without evil there would be no revelation of God” (Turner 439), and in The Signature of All 
Things, Boehme himself states, “Time past, present, and to come, as also depth and height, near 
and afar off, are all one in God, one comprehensibility.”2 This idea of sustaining opposites under 
a single spiritual umbrella is in significant opposition to many of his contemporaries and 
successors who defined the Protestant spirit by its opposition to scholasticism. Historically 
speaking at least, Boehme is right to view the spheres of piety and intellectualism as deeply 
related because scholasticism can be associated with the medieval church’s efforts in the 
intellectual and more acute avenues of theology and traced to the early Enlightenment thinkers 
such as Descartes.3  
In The Passion of the Western Mind, Richard Tarnas indeed says, “Descartes’s natural 
light of the human reason was the direct and half-secularized inheritor of that medieval 
conception” (Tarnas 299), and notes that the early players of the scientific revolution all spoke of 
their work “in terms conspicuously redolent of religious illumination” (Tarnas 299). 
Furthermore, Tarnas notes of the Protestant movement after Boehme, that  
“Intellectually sensitive Christians attempted to reinterpret and modify their religious 
understanding to accommodate a universe drastically different from that of the ancient 
and medieval cosmology…yet the deeply rooted principles of Christian belief could 
                                                          
1 Richard Tarnas states that Jakob Boehme was part 
of a wave of Rhineland “mystics” whose theology 
was mainly grounded in spiritual autonomy, the de-
emphasizing of institutional authority and suggesting 
the world is “suffused with the divine” and therefore 
no church or even sect should be necessary.   
2Jakob Boehme, the Signature of all Things, Part XV: 
Of the great Mystery in Good and Evil 
3 Richard Tarnas, The Scholastic Awakening and The 






scarcely be negated altogether. Thus arose, the psychological necessity of a double-truth 
universe. Reason and faith came to be seen as pertaining to different realms” (Tarnas 
302).  
Obviously in this invoking of historical lineage, Brown reveals that at the very least he means to 
question realms of culturally upheld truths regarding the separation and non-compatibility of 
certain ideas. 
 Jakob Boehme once said “A Christian is of no sect.”1 This rhetoric clearly shared the 
anti-institutional sentiment of Protestantism in general but can be a hypocritical critique in 
hindsight when considering the Protestant migration to America had yielded numerous sects. The 
character of the Elder Wieland choosing no sect, being described even as a perfectionist in this 
way, perhaps alludes to  this.  Boehme also spoke of the principle of life, what he called the 
“divine fire,”2 something that is thoroughly transmogrified by the sects of Germany, England, 
and the Netherlands, in the Trans-Atlantic migration of radical Protestantism, as in the Quakers’ 
idea of divine illumination. The symbols of divine fire and illumination appear center-stage 
(perhaps in a form more appropriate to the original) in Brown’s works of American Gothic.       
Brown makes the setting of Wieland—the rural “Mettingen”—extremely reminiscent of the 
community that settled in Germantown, near Philadelphia, known as “the Hermits of 
Wisshacken.” Their spiritual leader, one Johann Kelpius, began his journey in Germany, and 
similar to the Elder Wieland was influenced by the Camisard sect, and the Camisards were 
interested in the interpretation of Jakob Boehme’s doctrines.3 In Germantown, also reflecting the 
                                                          
1 As quoted by William Turner, Chapter 52, 
Protestant Mysticism  
2 William Turner, in, History of Philosophy, chapter 
52, Protestant Mysticism, provides detailed 
description of Boehme’s doctrine specifically, 
suggesting his work to be generally indicative of the 
early Protestant Lay Mysticism of Europe  







actions of the Elder Wieland, the hermits built a temple and practiced “contemplative solitude,” 
aimed at bringing them toward what Kelpius called—quite literally echoing Boehme—the 
“spiritual fire.”1 Considering then, that the Elder Wieland suffers death by mysterious 
spontaneous combustion, his similarity to the Hermits, yet lack of identifying sect is to be 
considered alongside the doctrines of Boehme.  For, if the purest essence of the soul is the divine 
fire then it is reasonable to view the Elder Wieland’s fate as a kind of success for him, knowingly 
or not, it was what he had always been in search of. Brown uses this historical lineage to connect 
his Protestant background with political and socio-economic theories of the Enlightenment, 
particularly the implications of a suggested purposeful latent quality to the anti-institutionalism 
shared by radical Protestant sects and revolutionary republicanism, through the language of 
forgotten early Protestant mystics like Boehme.  
 It is reasonable to notice first the interwoven themes of knowledge and “illumination,” in 
the plot of Wieland, yet Brown appears to prod deeper towards Boehme’s doctrines of eternal 
dualism and the nature of opposites to invoke contradiction in subsequent understandings of truth 
and illumination. For, the growing trans-Atlantic movement of political philosophy develops 
from the early scientific revolutionaries like Bacon, Newton, and Descartes who, according to 
Turner, worked under the conceptual umbrella of “illumination,” and Descartes’s philosophical 
work on rationality, in particular, expressed distrust of the senses.2 Subsequently, as the 
development of Protestant radicalism would reject notions of intellectualism, more modern 
brands of secular philosophy contributed to the widening of this gap with the spiritual, “the 
growing sense of political individuality and the gradual dwindling of the ideal of a universal 
                                                          
1 Peter Kafer, Chapter 4, Sins of Fathers  
2 William Turner, Chapter 51, the Scientific 
Movement. As Boehme of the early Protestant 
Mystics did not condemn scholasticism like his 
contemporaries, the early scientific, rationalists, pre-
dating the Enlightenment did not disallow 
expressions of spirituality in their philosophic 






Christian Empire were most important factors in the change from ancient to modern modes of 
thought” (Turner 443). The subsequent result that manifests in the emergent political philosophy 
of the Enlightenment is a trace of opposition to its Cartesian predecessor, most notably found in 
the work of Thomas Hobbes. The work of Hobbes is clearly irrelevant to the political 
environment of the Revolution in all of its specifics, but the general notions of the power of 
human empiricism is a facet that perseveres, and of which Turner defines in terms starkly 
contrasting Descartes, “neither is there in human knowledge any element superior to the sense” 
(Turner 444), thus suggesting a certain intellectual infallibility that Brown will recognize and 
criticize as it takes shape in America.1  
 One particularly useful passage for these purposes is when Pleyel, Catherine, and Clara 
hear Theodore’s explanation after hearing the first mysterious voice outside the temple of his 
father’s death. All three individual responses are given in some suggestive detail,  
“It was heard by us with different emotions; Pleyel did not scruple to regard the whole as 
a deception of the senses…Catherine was endowed with an uncommon portion of good 
sense but her mind was accessible on this quarter to wonder and panic…As to myself, my 
attention was engaged by this occurrence. I could not fail to perceive a shadowy 
resemblance between it and my father’s death” (Brown 34). 
 Pleyel clearly thinks himself a rationalist of the Enlightenment and speaks accordingly. 
Catherine, for all her good qualities, reacts by her mystical and religious training as Pleyel does 
his perceived rationalism.2 Clara is depicted as both rational and superstitious, and she is so both 
simultaneously and in compatibility. One could say her suspicion is superstitious by denying a 
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culturally agreed upon pretense for how reality works, but that her arrival at suspicion is rational 
because she makes the historical connection to the Elder Wieland as a lingering, evident notion 
that cannot be ignored for the sake of false peace of mind.  
When she continues, “I could not deny that the event was miraculous and yet I was 
invincibly averse to that method of solution,” one may begin to think she will join Pleyel in 
conventional rationalism, perhaps attributing the familial history to some predisposition to 
mental instability, but she stifles this assumption when she follows up with Theodore alone in the 
temple itself and says to him, “how almost palpable is this dark; yet a ray from above would 
dispel it…But why must the Divine Will address its precepts to the eye!” (Brown 34). Early on, 
it is apparent that Clara is no reliable narrator in the traditional sense of perspective and reality, 
but her confused state of opposing ideas and influences, the way her mind reacts to and reasons 
with the supernatural events of the story is significant; especially so when hearkening back to the 
familial history as an allusion because Clara is a Wieland alongside Theodore. Furthermore, her 
chosen words of, “why must the Divine Will address its precepts to the eye,” uses religious 
language to connote similar themes as the Cartesian mistrust of the senses that Pleyel was 
assumptively using in his assertion that the most rational explanation for this auditory phantom is 
that Theodore’s senses were deceived. It also subverts Pleyel’s words as he speaks of the 
deceptions of someone else’s senses while maintaining a steadfast position of rationalism for 
himself, whereas a more accurate reading of Descartes would lead him to consider the possibility 
of Theodore’s voices being real because of a mistrust of the foundation of that assumptive 






 Ultimately Clara’s characterization mirrors Brown’s “metahistoricism.”1 She says finally 
of the occurrence of the first voice, “its effect on my brother’s imagination was of chief moment, 
all that was desirable was that it should be regarded by him with indifference” (Brown 33), 
making the point that her personification of the precarious combination of mysticism and 
rationalism is the lens by which the Wieland history is correctly read by her instincts. This makes 
her statement about the ideal circumstance being the indifference of the present Wieland, to be 
both ominously prophetic and clearly sensible.  
 Brown has thus shown that the Wieland lineage represents the history of the migration of 
Protestant mysticism to America and the place that it found there, while also showing the newest 
Wieland generation, the first to be born American, to be representative of its place in the 
formation of ideas that would shape an American identity.2 Regarding this aspect of Brown’s 
weaving of historical allusions through lineage and abstracted kinship, Kamrath argues, in the 
sense of the two spheres in question, “he [Brown] frequently engages in religious and familial 
history as a means of responding to political debates about the separation of Church and State in 
governance,” and is often characterized by his, “willingness to stage—and then theoretically 
interrogate—the dynamics of political power and cultural hegemony” (Kamrath xviii). This 
assertion of extrapolating the familial history and its obvious connections to Protestant 
theological history outwards to include the political and cultural spheres, begins to take shape at 
the beginning of the following chapter, after “some time had elapsed” since the last mysterious 
event. Pleyel, in the aforementioned time lapse, had been away and, “On his return from Europe, 
                                                          
1 Mark L. Kamrath uses this term in the Historicism of 
Charles Brockden Brown to refer to his use of the 
novel as a platform for “reflecting more fully on the 
meaning and function of history—and historical 
truth.” 
2 In Chapter 4, Sins of Fathers, Peter Kafer notes that 
the two Wielands are quite similar, except that 
“where the father searched Camisard tracts for ‘the 






brought information of considerable importance to my brother. My ancestors were noble Saxons 
and possessed large domains in Lustia. The Prussian Wars had destroyed those persons whose 
right to these estates precluded my brothers” (Brown 35). The obvious connection to Old World 
imperialism is to be noted but what’s more interesting is Theodore’s response. He is against 
Pleyel’s proposal that he leave for Germany to claim his inheritance and when Pleyel presses 
with claims about the privilege of wealth and rank, resoundingly counters, “no spot on the globe 
enjoys equal security and liberty to that I at present inhabit” (Brown 36).1 He uses specific 
rhetoric of American revolutionaries to indicate, perhaps, the more specific location of Mettingen 
itself, which is indicative of radical Protestant “seeking” sects, such as Quakers, often settling the 
frontier wilderness while simultaneously carrying the echo of Jefferson’s Monticello.2 Keeping 
in mind the thematic grounding of Brown’s gothic fiction, criticizing the state of socio-politics in 
the 1790s, Wieland’s function seems to aim specifically at Jeffersonian Old World suspicion.   
 Theodore’s language carries two ideological sentiments, first the classical republican 
principle of civic humanism and government devotion to promoting the public good.3 Ironically, 
this Jeffersonian model aims at explicitly rejecting tyrannical monarchical notions that would 
have been found in the apologistic work of Hobbes, but shares a similar and unsettling 
implication with these condemned Hobbsean theories. That is, the state asking such faith of the 
citizen that it, “carries the doctrine of state absolution to the extreme of subjecting even 
conscience” (Turner 444).4 Second, the Protestant idea of seeking illumination in the wilderness, 
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supposedly away from corruption—both of these sentiments find a post-revolutionary home 
within ideals of the Jeffersonian commercial agrarian society.   
This is an appropriate statement, then, for the man who adorned his father’s temple of 
Protestant mysticism with a bust of Cicero, the literal face of classical republicanism. Both 
ideologies require a civic self-sacrifice for an idea of public good, and the historical placement of 
the story invokes a revolutionary mindset that called for the adoption of some enlightened 
political thought which tended towards absolutes and implied individualism in the frame of 
classical republicanism, for Thomas Paine says of the principles of the republic, “All great laws 
of society are laws of nature…They are followed and obeyed, because it is the interest of the 
parties so to do” (Strauss 680). Paine’s particular intimation is obviously similar to the religious 
motivation of blind faith believed to be assuring of salvation, but what’s more, Theodore does 
not recall the story of Roman, Ciceronian Republicanism; on this, Linda K. Kerber says, “the 
usefulness of the Roman example was blunted by the fact that Romans had transmuted 
republican precedent into Caesarian autocracy” (Kerber 3).1 The details of the Republic’s fall 
therefore adds to the weight of the historical allusion to American politics through the autocracy 
of dualistic idealisms in Theodore’s mind, and the fact that Cicero becomes popular for his 
works of tireless promotion of the republic against Caesarian autocracy but is ultimately 
martyred defending the cause of the latter.  
Referring to Kamrath’s statement about Brown’s specific use of familial history, it is 
interesting how the two Wielands, the two recipients of the family history and the accompanying 
“chimeras of the brain” (as Clara puts it, once again including herself in the line of what she 
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ultimately opposes and subverts), each represent the other’s foil. This is meant in the sense that 
Clara refers unreliability unto herself and unwittingly embodies a working dualism between the 
two expressions of “illumination,” while Theodore is always certain of himself—certain that he 
correct is in his early debate with Pleyel about certain points of Latin grammar in his Ciceronian 
texts, which leads him to venture to the temple for a confirming source and thus to the spot 
where he hears the first voice, and certain when he kills his family that it was God’s direct 
instruction to do so. He champions both spheres separately, and therefore in a blind 
contradiction. 
 As Peter Kafer notes of the relationship between the greater American revolution, 
inspired by republicanism and enlightened political philosophy and the “Philadelphia 
Revolution,” inspired by religious fervor, both were founded on the Lockean spirit of a “fresh 
start.”1 Clara in her internal struggle to process her perceived reality says, “The will is the tool of 
the understanding, which must fashion its conclusions on the notices of the sense. If the sense be 
depraved, it is impossible to calculate the evils that may flow from the consequent deductions of 
the understanding” (Brown 73). Hearkening to the ideals of classical republicanism which 
facilitates utopian sentiment towards migration to America and ultimately revolution—this set of 
ideas which defined virtue as a willingness to put the public good before private gain and 
emphasized a representative government committed to such endeavors2—Clara’s anxiety about 
“senses depraved,” is subtly hinting at that operation of said representative government. 
Metaphorically speaking, if the classical model is believed and citizens lead lives of civic virtue 
and entrust representation to political entities, such entities become the “senses” of the public 
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and if they are indeed operating by latent individualistic influence then the “senses” can indeed 
be described as depraved. Again, the metahistorical background of the 1790s enters the picture in 
that it appears Brown is portraying it in subversive contrast to revolutionary-era classical 
republicanism regarding the function, duty, and direction of representative entities.  
The historical allusion can be completed with a bit more insight from the work of Linda 
K. Kerber, on the state of post-revolutionary American society and politics. She aptly describes, 
in opposition to Theodore’s ideals and in agreement with Clara’s doubts, “When Jeffersonians 
found that the revolution had not produced the golden age they had so confidently expected, they 
re-defined the terms of the golden age” (Kerber 4).  Thus all the layers of the familial allusion 
are invoked at once by suggesting the “depraved sense” to be that notion of idealism which 
facilitates the trans-Atlantic migration —for the radical Protestants manifesting as a spiritual 
intuition, for the politically-minded revolutionaries as Lockean “right-reason.”1 This therefore 
informs Kafer’s concurring claim that Wieland suggests,  
“in view of the vagaries of the human mind, there can be no such clean start, for in the 
real world, testimony of the senses is necessarily cockeyed…and given the moral reality 
that all actions, good and particularly bad, engender their own autonomous, long-term 
consequences, how was the American Revolution, through its often inglorious not to say 
hypocritical means to bring into being the glorious and candid and sincere republic that 
the Revolutionaries themselves so rousingly proclaimed?” (Kafer 126).  
When again referring to the metahistorical narrative of the 1790s setting, Kafer’s assessments of 
the novel take on added meaning. For, both political parties had moved away from the classical 
republican model; Jeffersonians advocated for the agricultural-commercialism, championing the 
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yeoman farmers in his cause but stressing an ideal of plenty which heavily implies incentivized 
private gain as synonymous with public good, and Federalists denied the public had much say in 
matters of foreign policy, yet when the Jay Treaty was being proposed (a treaty that did not 
realistically do much except protect growing American mercantilism) they rallied to a chosen 
population of the public for support, appealing to the mercantile classes of New York and 
Philadelphia of which it would economically benefit.1 Needless to say, both can be seen as 
contradicting classical republicanism with nascent individualistic capitalism. 
  The champions of the revolutionary American ideological sentiment, those like 
Theodore Wieland, forget both Boehme’s doctrine of eternal dualism and Descrates’s warning 
to, “admit nothing as truth which is not perceived so clearly and distinctly as to admit of no 
doubt” (Turner 449). The contradictory denial of each other, caused by an ironically totalitarian 
misunderstanding of “truth,” makes the link of shared heritage apparent. Clara then—whose 
name, as many scholars have noted, sounds suspiciously like the connotative word, “clear”—is 
the Wieland who shows the allusion to Brown’s American “metahistoricism” through self-doubt 
and thus self-consciousness. Theodore Wieland, a usually troubling and ambiguous character to 
pin down, can then be viewed, in a certain sense, as the self-proclamatory contemporary state of 
each respective ideology. More specifically he is the radical Protestant defining trait of seeking 
illumination through a blind faith in religious intuition and the classical republican sentiment of 
citizen’s faith to the republic,2 which becomes blind in the midst of revolutionary fervor, leading 
to the change from government devotion to political integrity and the small producer to the 
                                                          
1 Todd Estes, The Politics of Public Opinion: 
Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate  
2 Willaim Turner, Chapter 53, Systems of Political 
Philosophies, writes that the social contract 
stipulates the individual to vest all his rights in the 
supreme and absolute authority of the state, and 
notes this aspect of Hobbsean theory lies starkly in 
contrast to the revolutionary use of proclaiming the 
citizens’ could break contract when they decided the 






obligatory faith of citizens for their regional and economic best-interest party in post-revolution 
society.  
The ultimate result of his endeavors in Wieland is a focus on the American identity, as 
inescapably linked to its European heritage, and the implications of the denial of this lineage 
required of American society by existing ideologies. Robert Miles suggests that gothic writing is, 
“a manifesto of new writing based on the authority of the old” (Miles 42), which, indeed, seems 
to be a definition of Wieland in general, but with the subsequent realization of a troublesome 
contradiction: this new writing informs the present that it is beholden to the authority of the old, 
while believing itself to be a separate entity made up of values assumed too progressive for it.  
  The Enlightenment’s preoccupation with human nature and Brown’s revelation of its 
latent perseverance of ideas, fits in with the fundamental gothic trait of historical self-critique. As 
Miles put is, “Gothic works reflect on the late sixteenth century anxiety over its place in history; 
a belief in providence endures, faith as fundamental benevolence did not. History’s pattern now 
seemed malign” (Miles 40). In other words, Brown gives a depiction of an American identity 
formed on a foundation of European history that when placed under the microscope of the 
Wielands at Mettingen is shown to be quite unstable, due to not only the idealistic fresh start of 
Protestant mysticism and its combination with Calvinistic expressions of pessimistic certainty, 
but also the allusion to faith in the mission of William Penn’s  religious community of 
Philadelphia, which came into being by way of a real-estate charter given by King Charles II, 
restorer of monarchy in England. Clara’s statement earlier about Theodore remaining indifferent, 
noted as both foreboding yet sensible now seems almost like clever sarcasm, as Calvinist grim 
pretensions on truth and certainty—which will ultimately influence those sects like the Quakers 






feeling more positive or idealistic—settles in comfortably next to republicanism in early America 
stressing liberty as an avenue of individual citizen sovereignty in ways that resemble the  
Lockean utopia.1 Of course the foreshadowed change will occur, in the novel by way of 
Theodore’s murderous spree and in the metahistorical narrative by the bipartisan separation, 
which was itself evidence that revolutionary notions of individual sovereignty—meaning a trust 
in the individual’s deciding and carrying out civic duty—did not remain true of the emergent 
political system.  
 The relationship between the two, deemed an unstable one, by its Mettingen micro-
representation, is then put through a gothic test of sorts, the specifics of which James P. Carson 
describes: “Gothic novelists defend their form as a quasi-scientific exploration of natural human 
nature under supernatural stress” (Carson 143). Therefore, in being subjected to the mysterious 
voices, Pleyel who initially seems a rational opposite to Theodore’s blind obsession, is shown 
under supernatural stressors, to blindly trust his own misguided senses; this is first demonstrated 
by his accepting of the voice informing him of the death of the German Baroness in spite of his 
resolute—but transparently flawed—sense of rationalism when Theodore purported to hear the 
voices, and second when he hears Carwin and Clara together and does not explore the source of 
the voices but forms an opinion based on the circumstantial presumption—which, at this point in 
the story, one would assume a true rationalist would have learned to treat with some skepticism. 
Furthermore, these contradictions between Pleyel’s professed philosophy and his actions become 
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reconciled when considering the underlying motivation of his character. The most basic trait in 
this sense is his unacknowledged passion for Clara, but the important factor being that his 
romantic love for her proceeds unacknowledged as a latent motivation for his actions.   
Blind faith in religion, as aforementioned, is not a new phenomenon, a main tenent of any 
religion is often salvation after death, a comfort to the anxieties of the ultimate unknown. 
Though Brown incorporates both secular and sacred in his criticism and indeed views them as 
intrinsically related, it is easier to sympathize with blind faith in religion because of the human 
anxiety of death and the afterlife. Pleyel, then can be said to represent the implications of 
obligation to government, which he supports with learned enlightenment, “rational,” philosophy, 
while constantly ignoring or suppressing his other defining trait of romantic passion. So, he 
initially speaks of Cartesian mistrust of the senses, but when faced with acknowledging the 
emotional and irrational—in the supernatural events of the story, but also within himself—he, 
almost instinctively, finds a false reassurance in the empiricist notion of superiority of the 
senses.1  His complacency in not acting, upon what to the reader seems obvious, because of a 
faith in sensible rationalism and intellectual understanding, truly appears to be more of a tactic of 
seeking comfort from that which he does not understand.  
Pleyel’s character explicitly suggests that there is danger in allowing intellectual 
infallibility to exist as an adhered-to cultural norm. Both Federalists and Jeffersonian 
Republicans would use this to their regional advantage in campaign—but the Federalists more 
doctrinally so, with their meritocracy of professional intellectuals. There is a definite sense of 
human frailty and vulnerability ascribed to Pleyel at this point in the novel, which seems to make 
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a statement about the inadequacy of cosmopolitan rationalism when considering the full breadth 
of the human experience.  
 If Clara represents the two revolutionary ideologies of radical Protestantism and 
revolutionary strains of classical republicanism in an anxious, precarious duality and Theodore 
represents the disastrously blind dichotomy, if the Mettingen community represents early 
America as a microcosm, and Clara’s foreboding and intuitive hope that Theodore remain 
indifferent to supernatural stressors therefore intimates both to be unstable, then Carwin’s 
entrance into the story as an outsider, unknown in origin and ambiguous in character must be 
significant. Clara assures this is the case with her similarly ominous foreshadowing, “Now I 
come to mention the person with whose name the most turbulent sensations are connected. It is 
with a shuddering reluctance that I enter on the providence of describing him…Let me stifle the 
agonies that are awakened by thy name” (Brown 45). Carwin essentially represents the 
individual spirit, the reality of the lay-man within these over-arcing socially governing 
ideologies. He represents the plight of the Scots-Irish immigrants—a population which, 
according to Peter Kafer seems to more readily grasp the changing environment towards 
individualism1—encroaching upon the sacred wilderness territory of the Quakers and other 
Protestant sects and carrying the capitalistic drive for individual comfort that is present under the 
revolutionary republican principle of selflessness for social commonality.2  
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 Carwin’s embodying Brown’s tactics of subversion is well represented as Clara first 
observes him walking through the rustic and picturesque Mettingen fields. She describes him as 
a “clown,” in other words a laboring-class person, and his appearance sets her off musing,  
“I reflected on the alliance which commonly subsists between ignorance and the practice 
of agriculture, and indulged myself in airy speculations as to the influence of progressive 
knowledge in dissolving this alliance, and embodying the dreams of the poets. I asked 
why the plough and the hoe might not become the trade of every human being, and how 
this trade might be made conductive to, or, at least, consistent with the acquisition of 
wisdom and eloquence” (Brown 46). 
 Though she lives in a rural area, her intellectual community and proximity to Philadelphia 
instills in her language the Federalist predisposition of viewing “plain folk” as ignorant in socio-
political philosophic matters, yet she continues to muse and begins to express a progressive 
hopefulness in the Jeffersonian model. She is invoking the allegorical image of the “yeoman 
farmer,”—an enlightened, virtuous, republican, gentry farmer that is idealistically romanticized 
in Brown’s era, notably in Jefferson’s own Notes on the State of Virginia.1 This image goes 
along with the poetic picturesque, which similarly expresses a vein of idealism and utopia in the 
image of some place of perfect and beautiful balance between forces of nature and of 
civilization.  
Brown therefore invokes the image ironically as his picturesque Mettingen community 
will drastically change towards that of the sublime, and the allusion to the image of a “yeoman 
farmer” is another example of Brown’s manipulation of language and semantics for the purpose 
of showing latent contradiction. This is due, first, to the etymological origins of the “yeoman 
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farmer” being distinctly rooted in feudal—not to mention Catholic—Europe,1 therefore the 
original cultural archetype lends itself more to the centralized power of Federalism, and second, 
to the Jeffersonian yeoman farmer expressed in terms of “virtue,”—remaining in the sense of the 
idealized classical republican way (public good before private gain)—because Jefferson also 
pushed an individual-capitalistic approach to agriculture included in his yeoman farmer image 
resting on the still idealized promise of prosperity. He uses the classical republican language of 
“virtue” to appeal to the public but inverts the meaning as incentive of gain—and nobody would 
have individually benefitted more than Jefferson himself from an American shift in emphasize to 
commercial agriculture.  
 Clara asks herself in these musings, “why not,” the plough and hoe could become the 
trade of every human being, again showing there is some republican idealism in her character but 
also subtly refers back to her self-awareness, by pointing out the present reality is not so. Such an 
ideal is simply that, an ideal. Furthermore, this passage connects to Clara’s statement in the end 
about Carwin being the only character to remain in rural America and noting he is best suited for 
it. Again, this is meant to reveal such political contradiction because Carwin is of the agricultural 
class, and he is certainly given the description of being enlightened, but he is anything but 
virtuous and embodies a disregard for republican notions of communal concordance. Clara, as 
Brown’s lens of historical self-awareness and Carwin as the ambiguous “other” to the ideological 
realms of comfortable certainty, therefore come together to make the final point.  
After the initial appearance of Carwin amongst a picturesque Mettingen—“This lawn was 
only traversed by men whose views were directed to the pleasures of the walk, or the grandeur of 
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the scenery” (Brown 46)—the rural community is immediately set upon by the awesome power 
of the sublime, “Next day arose in darkness and storm. Torrents of rain fell during the whole day, 
attended with incessant thunder, which reverberated in stunning echoes from the opposite 
declivity” (Brown 48). Also, keeping with the theme of Clara’s dualistic character providing 
ominous yet historically valid foreshadowing, it is interesting that the appearance of Carwin, 
heretofore unknown to her, and the sublimely described storm cause Clara to give another eerie 
prophecy, “Something whispered that the happiness we at present enjoyed was set on mutable 
foundations” (Brown 49), directly juxtaposing her brother, whose republican zeal influenced him 
to proclaim earlier, “no spot on the globe enjoyed equal security and liberty to that which we at 
present inhabit” (Brown 36).  
 Ultimately Carwin as the spirit of the individual unwittingly holds the power to 
undermine the representative republic, as it operates on the citizen fully buying in to the 
professed truth of the republic1 (even though in the allusion to the 1790s such truths become 
fractured and regional). However, the ambiguity of the plot never clarifies whether Carwin was 
the voice that told Theodore Wieland to murder his family. Even though he admits to be the 
cause of the earlier voices for purposes of simple mischief, he adamantly denies the morbid 
accusation of being that final one.  
David Michael Bell says, “The unreality of romance was above all psychological. What 
matters most in discussions of romance is psychological motive and effect” (Bell 121). In 
Wieland this constant changing of Clara’s considering Carwin as a threat, a friend, or a mere 
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nuisance is indicative of Brown’s gothicizing of these purported traits of American Romance. 
Bell goes on to say that the early American romances were, “focused on psychology and 
morality,”1 and Brown pretends to imitate this in painting Carwin, the “other” to the ideal 
Mettigen society, as the villain of the tale. Yet, in muddling the typical romantic separation of 
fancy vs. reason and imagination vs. actuality, Theodore, somewhat abruptly, emerges as the true 
threat to the ideal—a threat from within, brought to light through the catalyst of its reaction to 
the “other.” The strength of this reaction, also, stems from his steadfast position of certainty; 
narratively, this is his belief in mystical religious experiences under the guise of “illumination,” 
and the greater implication is the classical expression of citizen’s faith in the republic existing 
under false pretense.2   
This intimation is supported by Carwin himself when he is discovered in Clara’s closet. 
He tells her, “You believe yourself completely in my power; that you stand upon the brink of 
ruin. Such are your groundless fears. I cannot lift a finger to hurt you…the power that protects 
you would crumble my sinews, and reduce me to a heap of ashes in a moment, if I were to harbor 
a thought hostile to your safety” (Brown 81). First, Carwin tells her that her belief in his devious 
powers are unfounded, suggesting that while his role as an outsider is a threat to the ideal and 
therefore perceived as the cause for all Clara’s foreboding statements, he is not the real cause of 
danger to the stability of their community. That danger, obviously, comes from within, 
spearheaded by Theodore’s trust in conventional truths. Then, he specifically refers to himself as 
being averse to any action that is hostile to her safety, suggesting a Rousseauean3 or Godwinian 
notion of natural human compassion outside the influence of governing bodies—as he is the 
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individual, outside the citizen-government republican pact (or the regional citizen to that of their 
respective party). For, Godwin says in An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, “Society is 
nothing more than an aggregation of individuals,” referring to a natural form, non-beholden to 
government. Godwin continues to speak on the principles of government, responding to the 
Lockean notion of civil society and the social contract,  
“The whole principle of an original contract proceeds upon the obligation under which 
we are placed to observe our promises. The reasoning upon which it is founded is, ‘that 
we have promised obedience to government, and therefore are bound to obey.’ It may 
consequently be proper to enquire into the nature of this obligation to observe our 
promises. (Godwin 87)”  
Godwin seems to take issue with Lockean liberalism in the same way Turner criticizes Hobbsean 
empiricism in History of Philosophy, “Hobbes carries the doctrine of state absolutism to the 
extreme of subjecting even conscience and religion to the authority of the state” (Turner 444). 
The Godwinian perspective in Enlightened political philosophies informs Brown weaving of 
cultural and Trans-Atlantic contradiction, as he questions the ultimate breadth of influence this 
contractual obligation actually implies. He reveals that this same strain of obligation remains an 
underlying factor in post-revolution bipartisanship, specifically in propagandizing and the 
manufacturing of public perspective. Theodore’s belief in dichotomous truths serve the same 
governing agenda, as Turner suggests, his conscience has become subject to the state. The 
allusion to governing entities holding weakly-founded principles on morality and natural man 
comes full circle when Clara, after hearing of the deaths of Catherine and her children but not yet 
having found Theodore to be the murder, says, “…presumptuous would it be to attempt the 
classification of all nature, and the scanning of supreme intelligence” (Brown 113). Theodore’s 






whether he was truly spoken to by the divine or if he suffered from mental instability, but in light 
of Clara’s words spoken before she even knows of his involvement, it becomes clear that such a 
distinction is not what is important. What is important is that his unwillingness to question the 
principles delivered to him by his mere position and location in American society, leads him to 
commit heinous acts against his own family—significant because if there is one semblance of 
nature or instinct of humanity that is accepted in the arena of civilized society it is familial 
loyalty—while preserving his blind certainty in the maintained belief of his righteousness after 
the fact.  
Turner describes Locke’s view on how civil society emerges, “when man discovered the 
disadvantages of continuous strife, and realized that the safety of life and property is a condition 
essential to progress, they entered into a contract, by which it was stipulated that the individual 
should vest all his rights in the supreme and absolute authority of the state,” which starkly 
contrasts Godwin’s view of anarchy based on societies of individuals who are compassionate 
precisely because of a hypothetical lack of social obligations to one another.1 Carwin aligns with 
Godwin’s individual—albeit he cannot really be called compassionate, but more like harmless—
in questioning the nature of his obligation to the state. Godwinian theory attached to the plot of 
Wieland then places the true blame for Theodore’s murders, even though the immediate cause 
remains ambiguous, in his refusal to question the truth and objectivity of assumed constructs. 
Whether it be his Protestant intuitive search for illumination or the classical republican faith in 
governing representation, both encompass a contradictory duality under blind obligation. Also, 
Clara and Pleyel’s finally finding their stability back in Europe completes the familial history’s 
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allusion to political contradictions about utopia and prosperity in the new world. The early 
republicans used the clause in Lockean social contract theory about citizens being able to break 
with a government for breaching contract, to justify the American revolution from England, but 
they raise new institutions based on the same theories, still swathed in attributes from the Old-
World. In the subsequent political environment of the post-revolutionary era, Federalists 
maintain the necessity of state absolutism to protect the new American republic from criticism 
from its citizens and sustain ideals in this way, while simultaneously, Jeffersonian language of a 
prosperous country of commercial agriculture established by a socially esteemed agrarian class is 
simply an intellectual veil for motivating the public and the “plain folk” to take risks ultimately 
not in their self-interest—not conceptually far off from a feudal model. 
 The character of Theodore Wieland offers up a commentary through allusion, then, that 
becomes broader as history unfolds. He is assumed to represent the hypocrisy of American 
Revolutionaries’ republican proclamations, yet the wholeness of his demise, the appropriateness 
of being himself the most perilous danger to his family and community when he viewed the 
American countryside as a sanctuary from the corrupt and dangerous outside world, speaks to the 
nature of the American revolution, perhaps even the nature of political conflict in general. In 
other words, Theodore Wieland’s fate is suspiciously reminiscent of Edmund Burke’s criticism 
of the later French Revolution—which took condemnation of idealistic republican rhetoric to a 
place of outright frankness—saying, “The Revolution would end in bloodthirsty disaster,” and 
that, “men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.”1   
                                                          







 With Brown’s next few works of gothic fiction—Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist and 
Ormond—he seems to undergo some philosophical maturation in considering the intricacies of 
revolution, power, and influence that will culminate in his final gothic work, Edgar Huntly. As 
aforementioned, Theodore Wieland’s demise imitates Burke’s condemnation of the French 
Revolution.1 Since the catalyst of the French Revolution upon emergent politics in America 
informs the matter of ideology in Brown’s work, it may be appropriate to refer to one Antoine 
Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, a man who would pen one of the first intellectual works on the 
nature of ideology. Tracy was a French aristocrat, but in favor of the revolution, confident that it 
would result in true liberty for the individual. Though as the revolution unfolded, Tracy would 
see Burke’s words come to reality, and he would narrowly escape the guillotine himself.2 
Subsequently having experienced a change in viewpoint, he would begin the modern 
conceptualization of ideology. Though Brown’s work does precede Tracy, similar ideological 
characteristics nonetheless seem present in Brown’s work after Wieland.  
Of Tracy’s work, Jeremy Jennings states its main thesis to connote, “Philosophy would 
put an end to revolutionary barbarism and provide a solid foundation upon which the Republic 
could be established,” while still hopeful that this ideal could, theoretically, be an attainable goal, 
the point is that Tracy acknowledges of the French Revolution—of revolution in general 
perhaps—what Brown does of the American Revolution. That is, it is not built upon a solid 
philosophical foundation at all. Indeed, Kafer, in describing the intellectual club Brown was a 
part of—“the Friendly Society”—says, “Club discussions persistently and variously took up the 
radical French Enlightenment doctrine of the ‘perfectibility of man’” (Kafer 77). Memoirs of 
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Carwin the Biloquist essentially traces the titular character’s rise through the hierarchy of early 
American society to its pinnacle, where he finds only disillusionment and further alienation, in 
order make a self-conscious statement about influence and motive. Ormond portrays post-
Revolutionary America in dark, dishonest terms, making the leading characters who have fallen 
upon hard times utterly subservient to the manipulations of Ormond, their mysterious and rich 
benefactor. The two works profess the common themes of latent individualism and self-servitude 
at the expense of others, as Tracy would call it in his attempt to define ideology in terms of 
human nature—reminiscent of Locke’s philosophical reasoning for the formation of the social 
contract—the “duty to the self.”  
 Jefferson, a proponent of championing the reputation of the French Revolution, becomes 
a similar character in Brownian terms to these mysteriously motivated characters who are 
revealed to be a part of subversive secret societies—Ludloe in Carwin the Biolquist and Ormond 
in Ormond—in his Virginian anti-Federalist work during the early 1790s, which can even be 
considered propagandizing the French Revolution. Connor Cruise O’Brien writes that Jefferson’s 
followers were “precisely the sorts of Americans who were most attracted to the cause of the 
French Revolution” (O’Brien 75). He continues that on Jefferson’s return from France he would 
come to stress the favorability of the French revolution in support of anti-Federalist notions 
regarding the Federalist tendency towards monarchical structures but notes, 
 “Jefferson was a passionate devotee of the French Revolution, but he was also a subtle 
and calculating propagandist…the French Revolution had become an aspect of ‘the true 
God,’ inseparable and eternally part of ‘the holy cause of freedom’ proclaimed in the 
Declaration…These religious terms, so applied, had by now become standard parts of the 






 This moral idealizing provides a contradictory conclusion of the Jeffersonian model that 
individual ambition can be dutiful in the same sense as classical republican civic virtue and 
public good; this is essentially the exact political circumstance that Edmund Burke in his 
reflecting on the events of the French Revolution calls “a well-wrought veil.”1  
Essentially, what Brown’s intermediary works are seeking to demonstrate is that 
“ideology,” as Tracy thought to be the benign “science of ideas” and their insights into the 
human experience, inadvertently sheds light upon historical, intellectual misdeeds.2 Later 
criticism of Tracy’s work indeed makes this point that Brown anticipates. Emmett Kennedy calls 
it, “ideological phenomena,”—those points of individualistic justification in Tracy’s work that 
must be “outlined for investigation—unconscious intellectual habits, the liaison or association of 
ideas particularly in language” (Kennedy 355). Brown expresses similar suspicious sentiments 
on power and civic virtue, and in recognizing that which Tracy does not—the “unconscious 
intellectual habits”— employs the same theoretical sentiments towards his critique of governing 
bodies, made all the more apparent by the political environment of bipartisanship. 
 
Part II: Edgar Huntly and Brown’s Social Commentary  
 In tracing the historical changes in the term “ideology,” Emmet Kennedy attempts to 
articulate how Marx would be influenced by, but ultimately change, Tracy’s Ideology: 
 “The uniqueness of Tracy’s liberal economics is its title, which Marx frequently cited as 
an exemplary defense of capitalism. Ideology, thanks to Tracy, became for Marx neither 
simply science of ideas nor liberal political theory, but a system of thought which seeks 
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to justify the existing mode of production and the social relationships which spring from 
it” (Kennedy 368).  
This will be what Brown concurrently recognizes in American society and subverts with his 
gothic fiction. Tracy outlines the most sensible treatise for the mechanism of society and 
identifies that intellectual progress can be had once these mechanisms have been acknowledged. 
However, no sooner has he achieved this than he must face realization that his principles on 
individuals in society extends to intellectual and philosophical spheres, whose ongoing 
manipulation he had inadvertently justified. Kennedy again specifies, “Tracy had ‘undeniably 
come the closest of all metaphysicians to the positive state,’ but he had not reached it for no 
sooner had he declared that ‘ideology is a part of zoology,’ than his ‘metaphysical nature soon 
gained the upper hand and led him to discard this luminous principle immediately’” (Kennedy 
365).1 Tracy is progressive and influential, but it is difficult for his theories to actual achieve 
progress when he includes justification for that which he seems to oppose. He gives 
insurmountable support for capitalist endeavors building society and that these are natural to the 
human drive and therefore when faced with the reality of “ideological phenomena” of the 
intellectual social elite (inevitably bleeding into politics and “national will”) he seems to almost 
get lost in his own theories. Kennedy paraphrases Tracy’s defense of criticism: “ideologues did 
not form a sect, used strictly empirical methods, and adulated no philosopher” (Kennedy 367). 
Tracy seems to now become slightly contradictory as well, in condemning the nature of forming 
sects and holding philosophical lineages, which can be justified by capitalist duty to “self,” and 
he takes on shades of that wretch existing outside of society that he also previously condemned 
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as the ultimate opposition to one’s individual self-interest. It may be safe to assert that the 
realistic likelihood of Tracy’s version of ideology—which he hoped would lead humans towards 
progressivism—subsequently results in the way of the pessimistic Elder Wieland’s spontaneous 
combustion in solitude and separation from society rather than the advantageous Carwin’s fluid 
and free movement within it.  
The reconciled image of the Elder Weiland’s “successful” combustion is completed when 
taken into account a particular criticism of Tracy’s theories on the foundation of morality in a 
population, noted again by Emmet Kennedy, “the preacher could be silenced by the legislator 
who could discontinue his salary. Ideology not religion, was the basis of morality” (Kennedy 
370). This is all too true, as he himself had justified the actions of said legislator, which comes 
from justice, which comes from duty, which proceeds from the self, and therefore “liberty” is 
only the augmentation of power. Thus, it is appropriate that Napoleon—the man perhaps most 
responsible for reinstating imperialism in Europe after the revolutionary era—uses the 
subsequent principles of non-inclusion by Tracy’s pupils and followers, to adhere to the populace 
and claim these principles spelled atheistic tendencies, dangerous to Christian morals.1 
 Similarly, Brown’s next gothic work, Edgar Huntly, or Memoirs of a Sleepwalker, is 
thematically centered on the twisting of a popular perception, the cultural implications and 
realistic consequences for the members of the public. As Tracy’s work on ideology served to 
identify the concept, it also served to justify the capitalist drives that had worked beneath the 
surface of American idealism,2 and the Napoleonic reinstatement of the imperialist power 
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structure to Europe exemplifies the problem with identifying ideology and not condemning 
moral codes based on individual motive and ascension. It seems apparent that Brown had already 
come to this conclusion in his last and perhaps most complete work of gothic fiction, Edgar 
Huntly, with its deep allusions to a commentary on American socio-political culture. He 
succeeds where Tracy does not because the subtlety of his gothicism served to criticize but not to 
offer certainty or validity of other theories in opposition, more so to question and perhaps 
validate a cultural anxiety that stands in opposition to ideological holds on real individual 
freedoms.   
The forming of the bipartisan political structure influencing the political affiliation of 
American citizens, for the most part, did not yet greatly damage the structure of American 
Exceptionalism—or more correctly the separate claims as to the ideal path to Exceptionalism. 
However, it would be untrue to say Brown is alone in his suspicions. One of his contemporaries, 
who expressed views almost exactly parallel to Brown’s in his layering of historical allusions in 
Edgar Huntly, was Fisher Ames. Ames penned Dangers of American Liberty, in which he wrote 
on the bipartisan system and present American culture, “The clamor of party are so loud, and the 
resistance of national vanity is so stubborn, it will be impossible to convince any but the very 
wise that our democratic liberty is unattainable; that we are devoted to the successive struggles 
of factions, who will rule by turns.”1 It makes sense in agreeing with Ames on the American 
issue, and in preceding Tracy’s work on ideology with the added recognition of inevitable 
inequalities created through its usage, Brown’s Edgar Huntly seems to align closest with the 
Marxists who would succeed him. This is because Ideology conceptualized in Marxist theory 
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serves the purpose of working with the same social mechanisms, without the invocation of 
capitalism regarding economic competition oriented as instinctual drives incorporated in human 
“zoology.” This part of Tracy’s work on ideology and the defense of capitalism, Auguste Comte 
appropriately refers to as “truths” that act as social barriers in society.1 Furthermore, in lieu of 
what is useful about Tracy’s work, Brown’s recognition of contradiction in Wieland, 
conceptualized through Boehme’s eternal dualism re-enters philosophical consideration in an 
impactful way. That is to say, political spheres of influence, backed, as Paul C. Rogers says 
“anthropologically,” by the ideas of Hobbes and Locke2—such as Jeffersonian Republicanism 
and Federalism—as well as the subservient religious spheres of influence—such as the Protestant 
“seeking” sects—could be said to presumably satisfy Tracy’s duty to the “self” through a belief 
that advancement in power for their leaders is beneficial to their own social positioning. But 
achievement of this loyalty is tied to the promise of prosperity, ultimately an expression of 
unattainable—at the very least decidedly hypothetical—ideals for their followers. One major 
implication of Edgar Huntly is that regional and cultural separation of political perspective and 
adhered-to values becomes a transparent projection of subjective or temporary self-satisfaction 
onto the various social spheres of the American public.3 They are therefore capitalistic in nature, 
through emphases on individual concern and the joining of individual well-being not with the 
“public good” as with classical republicanism but with the success of the public economy and in 
structure, through Brown and Ames’ specific criticisms, which sound quite similar to the later 
Marxist critique of capitalism as a whole.  
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This individualistic-capitalistic sentiment in American politics is exemplified best by 
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers when he appeals to the citizen’s self-interest in 
arguing commerce over agriculture, “A prosperous commerce is now perceived and 
acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be most useful, as well as the most productive, 
source of national wealth. And as such as accordingly become a primary source of our cares.” He 
uses the term “enlightenment” now as merely a tool of language to support his cause and 
subsequently argues that there should exist no more rivalry between the agriculturalist and the 
merchant, that the agriculturalist should agree with Federalist protocol based on the expressed 
unequivocal sensibility of Hamilton’s words that a strong national government built on 
international trade would inevitably raise the value of land as well.1 Here, in discussing 
Hamilton’s contribution to Federalism—particularly the nascent trends of individualistic 
capitalism pushed upon a public through ideals—it may be interesting to note Brown’s one 
personal experience with Hamilton himself. According to Kafer, Alexander Hamilton, leading 
troops during the Revolution broke into Brown’s childhood home—a Quaker home and therefore 
a pacifist one and therefore probably considered a Tory one as well—and stole food, clothing, 
and blankets, in the name of the revolution and the greater “public good.”2 While admittedly a 
stretched claim at best, it does make one wonder about the connection between this purported 
run-in with the revolutionary Hamilton, expressing all the revolutionary doctrines of classical 
republican civic virtue in the expression of public good over private gain, yet leaving room for 
suspicion of genuineness due to the fact that Quakers specifically were often targeted by 
revolutionary militiamen for these kinds of supplies raids. It would make quite the biographical 
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parallel between Brown’s gothic fiction calling into question the genuine motives of both 
Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian political ideas.  
The Cartesian sentiments of mistrusting the senses and also mistrusting the authority of 
the past,1 that are expressed rather ambiguously, in Wieland, now take on a most resounding 
significance in Edgar Huntly. This grand endeavor of displacing the common American 
perspective on the positions from which their idealistic culture and identity flows forth, calls for 
an all-encompassing historical breadth, and so Edgar Huntly’s interactions with the Indians ties 
together—socially—the beginning of the American idealistic identity lodged in the distant and 
unmovable past to the tensions of Brown’s present at the end of the eighteenth century.2  
 Edgar Huntly’s adventures in the Norwalk wilderness and the background information of 
his family being murdered by Indians, is again one of Brown’s historically “self-conscious” 
allusions. Peter Kafer states, “when Edgar travels north and west into Norwalk, he is travelling 
into a place where the past hangs heavy, where its energies, its angers, its terrors, still haunt” 
(Kafer 176). However, Brown purposefully displaces the time period from its historical parallel: 
“Yet the historical incidents that personally shadow Edgar in the time-warp that is Edgar Huntly 
are not from 1755-1757; they are all from the Revolutionary period. This was when, according to 
Edgar, ‘savages’ and ‘assassins,’ had murdered his family. But historically speaking, no such 
savagery prevailed during the Revolution, at least not here” (Kafer 176). In Edgar Huntly, 
Brown will lead his titular character through trials and tribulations, that include other allusions to 
countless revolutionary-era social issues—mostly through the various sub-plots—all finding 
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similitude within the backdrop of a seemingly obscure historical occurrence: the alleged 
defrauding of the Delaware Indians by immediate members of the Penn family. 
In 1737, the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, James Logan, along with three woodsmen 
used an unfinished deed from 1686 to claim the Delaware Indians had sold land to William Penn 
in 1686 that had yet to be surveyed. He allegedly did this on the order of William Penn’s sons, 
and accomplished the fraud by showing the Indians a faked map of separate lands that had been 
previously sold. The word Norwalk for the forest wilderness Edgar becomes entrenched within is 
a play on the word “North-Walk” referring to the walking survey that Logan embarked on in 
1737 to mark off the defrauded land. Subsequently he enlisted the help of the powerful Iroquois 
Indians, cutting them into a portion of the stolen lands of which they had no historical right, to 
complete the eviction of the Delawares. In 1755, during the French and Indians War, the 
formerly peaceful Delawares began attacking white Pennsylvania settlements.1 
 Nottingham’s John Churchman, a powerful members of Pennsylvanian Quaker society, 
and a relative of Brown was in Philadelphia in 1757 when settlers from Northampton—people 
who had since purchased lands from the Penns, included in the domain of the defrauded 
Indians—brought in “two or three of the dead bodies…in wagons, and with the intent as was 
supposes to animate the people to unite in preparations of war, to take vengeance on the Indians, 
and destroy them” (Kafer 175). Churchman responds to this event in his own autobiography, “It 
felt to me that many did not consider, that the sins of the inhabitants, pride, profane swearing, 
and drunkenness with other wickedness were the cause, that the Lord suffered this calamity and 
scourge to come upon us.”2 Needless to say, the Quakers were among those who did not favor 
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war or defense of the frontiersmen from attack. Churchman first surmises to lay the blame on the 
victims of attack, when history clearly paints a different picture. These citizens merely inhabit 
disputed lands, lands that are disputed, no less, because of the actions of the Penn family.1 The 
Quakers staunch opposition to retaliation against the Indians places them on the same level of 
involvement as the Indians who had attacked. This is so because, technically speaking, they have 
caused the dispute (especially so in the frame of the Brownian gothic, with its emphasis on 
aspects of forgotten or ignored lineage), sold the land to the unsuspecting, then ignored the call 
for aid through either deliberate and thus, nefarious, means, or through an ignorance of their own 
past, as was the morbid fault of Theodore Wieland. They have contributed to the murders the 
same as the Indians, but merely have an ideology of pacifism and moral superiority to shield 
themselves.  
  During the revolutionary period, patriotic republicans in Philadelphia condemned 
Quakers as Tories for their loathing to fight, and fed the social feud between Quakers and Scots-
Irish immigrants by taking advantage of the Scots-Irish readiness to become militiamen.2 Kafer 
notes that to a Quaker in revolutionary Philadelphia the only “savage” they knew were the Scots-
Irish. Then in the late 1790s, Philadelphia sees an influx of more Irish immigrants, a subsequent 
Quaker paranoia about an Irish mob rising, and a Quaker appeal to the new Federalist 
government who held them in high-esteem—ironically—for their ability in peace talks with 
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Indians.1 Furthermore, issues with foreign policy leads to partisan Federalist vs. Republican 
conflict and American newspapers catering to the specific political views of their separate 
communal populations.2  
This is important to note because it reveals how Brown is once again using his Quaker 
familial history to illustrate larger social contradictions. For example, during the revolution the 
patriots justified action with republican principles on the greater good and therefore the Quakers 
were persecuted as Tories and treated harshly. Also during this time many prevalent Quaker 
leaders warned against the evils of commerce, Charles Brockden Brown’s own father, Elijah, is 
an example of this, having been expelled from Quaker meetings due to his debts acquired as a 
merchant. Yet, after the revolution, the Washington administration recognized that Quakers were 
useful negotiators with Indians, due to a trust the two social groups had formed most likely 
because of the Quakers’ disarming pacifism. This continues as Philadelphia comes under 
Federalist influence in the 1790s and with the influx of mostly Democratic-Republican leaning 
Irish immigrants—who still held the title of “savages” to the Quakers—the Quaker community 
went from revolutionary-era social outsiders to the post-revolutionary environment where they 
enjoyed greater social esteem due to the change in the interests of those in power. Furthermore, 
even though the Quakers continue to warn against the greed of commercialism and the 
Federalists operated on a principle of strong international commerce, the Philadelphia Quaker 
James Emlem, after a meeting with Timothy Pickering—a Federalist administrator also of 
Philadelphia—noted, “the contrast between those who formerly executed Government in 
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Pennsylvania who were impelled by that selfish jealousy which a dark and covetous policy 
inspires, and the present rulers of the United States.”1 The present rulers at this time are John 
Adams and the Federalist Party, therefore demonstrating that Emlen’s blind contradiction to 
traditional Quaker values is either the result of a complete lack of political understanding, or 
evidence towards the assimilation of the ideology of self-servitude.    
Brown, in the plot of Edgar Huntly, encompasses dominant value systems of three 
different historical time periods in American history, to illustrate different social groups each 
taking a turn in the disenfranchisement of greater society largely based upon a capitalistic 
competition between them. Edgar Huntly, in his journey, will take on the roles of the pacifist 
Quaker, the hearty frontiersman, and the “savage” Indian. When aligned with Brown’s 
historically self-conscious time line, the convergence clearly serves to join them together in a 
proto-Marxist Proletariat grouping, supporting and anticipating Althusser’s assertion that “the 
whole of the political class struggle revolves around the state. By which I mean the seizure and 
conservation of state power by a certain class or by an alliance between classes or class 
fractions” (Althusser 1340). Kafer’s statement that Edgar ventures into a place where “the past 
hangs heavy,” is therefore more telling than perhaps he realizes, as Brown looks to the past for a 
way of connecting its recessive incidents to the state of things at the present. What this amounts 
to theoretically, is Brown suggesting a take on ideology similar to the Marxist, Louis Althusser. 
As Althusser explains, “dominant social systems and institutions subtly mold human subjects 
through ideology, in turn reproducing the system” (Althusser 1532), and once again Brown 
seems to be echoing his contemporary, Fisher Ames, specifically the opening passage of 
Dangers of American Liberty, “The political sphere like the globe we tread upon, never stands 
                                                          






still, but with a silent swiftness accomplishes the revolution which we are too ready to believe 
effected by our own wisdom.” 
Edgar opens his tale, which consists mostly of letters to his fiancé, Mary, with a, now 
distinctly Brownian, foreshadowing, “What light has burst upon my ignorance of myself and 
mankind! How sudden and erroneous the transition from uncertainty to knowledge!” (Brown 6). 
This can be taken in direct reflection of the uncertain, unexplained way his body is manipulated; 
yet through this dark, irrational plot point, lies his path to a greater understanding of himself and 
a shedding of light upon the nature of mankind. He thinks upon the past, on the murder of his 
family years ago by Indians and on the mysterious death of his late friend, Waldegrave. He 
describes his emotions in such a way: “the insanity and vengeance and grief into which I was 
hurried my fruitless searches for the author of this guilt, my midnight wandering and reveries 
beneath the shade of that fatal elm were revived and re-acted” (Brown 6). The elm here is a 
highly significant symbol. It is a boundary between rural picturesque and sublime wilderness, 
between the territory of the men of European heritage and that of the Delaware Indians, and also 
the theoretical boundaries of social groups separated by constructed ideologies and the sublime, 
primitive wilderness where Edgar truly has the experience of “natural man.” 
 Althusser argued that societal structures determine lived experience,1 and indeed, the 
experiences that Edgar has on either side yield vastly different results in his worldview. On the 
one side—that of civilized society—Edgar says the Elm revived and re-acted his feelings of 
vengeance, he is struck in a cycle of which there seems no escape is, as no perpetrator can be 
identified, but he is fueled nonetheless, because he believes it to be the deed of a “savage,” (be it 
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the Indians that had previously killed his family or the revolutionary “savages,” the Scots-Irish 
whom Clithero represents). After seeing Clithero at the Elm and attaining brief information on 
his background as an Irish immigrant, he concludes prematurely that Clithero is Waldegrave’s 
murderer. He is quite obsessed with vengeance but his Quaker pacifism plays upon his 
conscience,  
“That Clithero was instrumental to the death of Waldegrave, that he could furnish the 
clue, explanatory of every bloody and mysterious event, that had hitherto occurred, there 
was no longer the possibility of doubting. He, indeed, said I, is the murderer of 
excellence, and yet it shall be my province to emulate a father’s clemency, and restore 
this unhappy man to purity, and to peace” (Brown 24). 
 His accusation of Clithero as a violent man, because circumstantially he appears so, is reflective 
of when leading Quakers in Philadelphia such as the Churchmans were jailed during the 
revolution for their pacifism. They wrote vehemently in their personal journals, not of the 
zealous patriots leading Philadelphia, but of their Scot-Irish jailers, simple enlisted militia-men.1 
His subsequent false moral superiority, as he decides to forgive Clithero which therefore restore 
him to peace, is reflective of the Philadelphia Assembly of the 1750s when the Quakers refused 
to aid Scots-Irish frontiersmen from Indian raids due to their pacifism and John Churchman’s 
morally superior—not to mention hypocritical—statement that it was retribution for their own 
drunkenness. Only in venturing beyond the boundary and into the wilderness does he find his 
answer to this initial mystery of Waldegrave’s death, but by then his perception on society has 
changed and he desires no vengeance. This is facilitated by his experiences in the wilderness, 
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and ironically it is specifically in the act of doing violence and breaking his pacifist code that his 
vengeful desires completely abandon him.  
In learning of Clithero’s true tale, the reader is informed that Clithero is impeded from 
achieving a social ideal through the selfish greed of one Arthur Wiatte—the brother of the lady 
he serves and whose illegitimate daughter he is betrothed to. Arthur was thought to be sent as a 
prisoner of debt to America but he returns unannounced. His return subsequently starts Clithero 
on a downward spiral of deranged events that ruins his ideal. These events begin with the spark 
of concern and recognition of social institutional practice, “what were the limits of his power? 
How may he exert the parental prerogatives?” (Brown 48), suggesting that Clithero sees Wiatte 
first, not as a threat to his safety and that of his fiancé, but of a threat to the marriage that would 
ascend his social standing to a presumably ideal position. He goes on to say, “It would be hard 
for those to partake of our fears, who did not partake of our experience” (Brown 48), and here he 
is not only alluding to the privileged—those social groups who would become conceptualized as 
the bourgeois—being unable to distinguish barriers to the ideal because their experiences present 
none, but also to the social barriers based on perceptions formed of specific experiences that will 
result in Proletariat group competition between each other in a capitalist environment. Therefore 
the parallel drawn between Edgar, the morally superior Quaker and Clithero, the rugged and 
wretched Irishman, is that they both experience a threat of capitalistic greed to their ideal 
marriage. For Clithero, is was the reappearance of Arthur Wiatte, and for Edgar it comes in the 
form of Weymouth.  
Weymouth mysteriously presents himself at the Huntly household, claiming that he lent 
Waldgave money before his death, and as Edgar is in charge of Waldegrave’s affairs, Weymouth 






money to book passage from Europe for his sick relatives, playing upon the alternate side of 
Edgar’s Quaker moral superiority, and he admits he must give Weymouth the money if he can 
come up with any more proof. This money was all that he was depending on for his marriage to 
his own fiancé, Mary. Furthermore, Edgar adds of the precariousness of his own situation, “My 
uncles’ death will transfer this property to his son, who is a stranger and an enemy to us, and the 
first act of whose authority will unquestionably be to turn us forth from these doors” (Brown 
105), which is perhaps the most blatant of connotations to the fickleness of authority under 
circumstantial changes. Not surprisingly, as Clithero and Edgar now share a common experience 
or capitalistic anxiety, the night immediately after Weymouth’s visit, is when Edgar seems to 
take on Clithero’s sleep-walking condition, and awakes alone in the dark, subterranean cavern.  
When Edgar awakes, he does not at first know where he is, his memory is failing him, “I 
endeavored to recall the past, but the past was too much in contradiction to the present, and my 
intellect was too much shattered by external violence, to allow me accurately to review it” 
(Brown 107). This hearkening of contradiction between past and present, again must be noted as 
reminiscent of the situation with the Pennsylvanian social groups before during and after the 
Revolution, “the intellect shattered by external violence” recalling once more that part of Tracy’s 
ideology that proves useful for Brown—the inability for the wage-earners to see beyond their 
present circumstances because subsistence and existence in society are too closely related. 
Edgar’s experience in the cavern is the pivotal point in the theoretical arc of the story. His 
awaking there, unsure of the location, how he arrived, whether his senses have left him and he is 
blind, whether his mind has left him and his is mad, ultimately what he describes is utter 






and sensibilities, everything that he had made his identity upon, can be evaporated by the 
invocation of the primitive mind.  
The only possession Edgar has with him is an Indian Tomahawk, which he uses to kill a 
panther lurking nearby in a scene that completes the social breakdown.  
“There was no time for deliberation and delay. In a moment he might spring from his 
station and tear me to pieces…all the force that remained was mustered up and exerted in 
a throw…though tottering on the verge of dissolution, and apparently unable to crawl 
from this spot, a force was exerted in this throw, probably greater than I had ever before 
exerted. It was resistless and unerring. I aimed at the middle space between the glowing 
orbs. It penetrated the skull and the animal fell, struggling and shrieking, on the ground” 
(Brown 112). 
 Brown seeks to truly isolate Edgar from all connection to humanity and therefore to society, by 
emphasizing the primitive and animalistic so that all else besides survival and instinct becomes 
truly arbitrary. He continues this goal to its appropriate end, “The first suggestion that occurred 
was to feed upon the carcass of this animal. My hunger had arrived at that pitch where all 
fastidiousness and scruples are at an end. I crept to the spot…I will not shock you by relating the 
extremes to which dire necessity had driven me” (Brown 112). Having killed the panther, 
through necessity and the instinct to survive, Edgar has become the savage himself, and in 
consuming it, he takes on the connection to the sublime, in the sense that he is now effectively 
disconnected from social influences and their fostered anxieties among and between social 
groupings. In the fashion of a Brownian Gothic, he is entrenched in darkness to become 
enlightened, he must become primitive to come to a realization about the civilized. Again similar 






the conscious is subjected to,1 Edgar falls asleep after consuming the panther raw, but this time 
he does not sleepwalk but dreams, “I was visited by dreams of a thousand hues. They led me to 
flowing streams and plenteous banquets, which, though placed within my view, some power 
forbade me to approach” (Brown 113). After his experience becoming a part of the wilderness, 
Edgar is faced with an inevitable change in perception regarding his own morals and world 
views—his own ideological chains—and the recognition that arbitrary social fractions develop 
from bourgeois influence and manipulation of tempting yet unrealistic idealisms.  
When he finds his way out of the subterranean cavern he comes upon the Indians with the 
young girl held captive. This sight immediately re-establishes the social positioning for Edgar, 
but this switching of weaponry—Edgar still with the tomahawk and the sleeping Indian with 
none other than Edgar’s own musket—represents the seeds of discord sown in his mind 
pertaining to these social relationships. When he rescues the girl and they escape down the 
mountainside to the abandoned house of Old Deb he says,  
“In spite of the force and uniformity with which my senses were impressed by external 
objects, the transition I had undergone was so wild and inexplicable; all that I had 
performed; all that I had witnessed since my egress from the pit, were so contradictory to 
precedent events, that I still clung to the belief that my thoughts were confused by 
delirium” (Brown 129).  
He ends up killing the rest of the Indians as they approach the house and his Quaker-trained 
pacifism no longer impedes him. He still does not relish the killing—“I formed a sort of 
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resolution to shun the contest with a new enemy…I was satiated and gorged with slaughter” 
(Brown 132)—but he no longer mentions any religious language involved in this loathing. 
 The changes in his social perceptions are best exemplified when he kills the final Indian, 
who, sneaking up on all fours, is reminiscent of the panther that he had killed for survival. Edgar 
takes his shot and the Indian,  
“lost all power of resistance…he rolled upon the ground, uttering doleful shrieks, and 
throwing limbs into those contorsions which bespeak the keenest agonies to which ill-
fated man is subject…Horror, compassion, and remorse, were mingled into one sentiment 
and took possession of my heart. To shut out the spectacle, I withdrew from the spot, but 
I stopped before I had moved beyond hearing his cries…Could I not, at least, bring his 
pangs to a speedy close? Thus he might continue, writhing and calling upon death for 
hours. Why should his miseries be uselessly prolonged…to kill him outright was the 
dictate of compassion and of duty” (Brown 133).  
This scene connects to the earlier scene when he is about to confront Clithero. In the earlier 
scene Edgar is consumed with vengeance but observes his social institutional training, his 
Quaker sensibilities and pacifism, noting that he will force a confession and forgive him, 
believing this route to be that which they both will find peace of mind. But he completely 
misreads the Clithero situation; he speaks from a place of moral superiority and pities him, 
hypocritically not realizing how they are alike. In the later scene, Edgar has done away with his 
institutionally received values. He kills the Indian, but does not feel any fulfillment of 
vengeance, and he does not pity the Indian as a wretch but looks upon him with compassion, he 
is remorseful for killing him, but perhaps it is more correct, in terms of subtext, to say he is 
remorseful for the circumstances that made killing him necessary. As he leaves the murderous 






his tomahawk…prompted by some freak of fancy, I stuck his musket in the ground, and left it 
standing upright in the middle of the road” (Brown 134). In having the opportunity to switch 
back to their socially compatible weaponry, he instead chooses to keep the weapon of the Indian 
and leaving the gun, completing the cycle of recognition that he and the Indian, and also 
Clithero, are all alike, taking part in the human social environment that proves more sinister than 
the awesome and sublime wilderness where Edgar literally cheats death numerous times. 
At the very end of the tale, there is finally closure regarding the death of Waldegrave, 
“Queen Mab,1 three days after my adventure, was seized in her hut on suspicion of having aided 
and counselled her countrymen, in their late depredations. She was not to be awed or intimidated 
by the treatment she received, but readily confessed and gloried in the mischief she had done; 
and accounted for it by enumerating the injuries which she had received from her neighbors” 
(Brown 186). Again, this last line must refer to the initial historical inspiration for the novel, the 
defrauding of the Delaware Indians by the Penns, but at this point in Edgar’s experience there is 
no emotion left to be attached to this exasperating issue of placing blame and satisfying 
vengeance, all he has to say on the matter is, “suspicions and doubts, by which my soul was 
harassed, and which were injurious to the innocent are now at an end” (Brown 187).  
What Brown does with his social commentary contained within Edgar Huntly’s historical 
allusions is take opposition with influential idealism in any socio-political discussion by 
demonstrating how social spheres may generate and train their population with these ideals based 
on a subjective perspective or an agenda that influences the individual within a social 
population—essentially what Althusser called the “unconscious being informed by the 
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experiences of the conscious.” He achieves this with suggestions about the state of the individual 
consciousness as subjected to the ideological recognition of cyclical patterns appearing in the 
historical reality. He is again subversive by hearkening to the transmogrified sensibility of 
classical republicanism, as cyclical readings of history is endemic to classical republican 
ideology as well, he uses such a principle to criticize its own effect on social reality. As a 
Marxist would say, he successfully illustrates the greater social consequences of “The 
reproduction of the means of production.” Joseph Cropsey, in his commentary on Karl Marx 
states, “Marx repeatedly asserts that the study of man must concern itself with ‘real’ mean, not 
with men as imagined or hoped for or believed to be. Marx means by this that the foundation of 
social science is not a notion of some wished-for human good, or some reconstruction of pristine 
‘natural’ man, but rather empirical man” (Cropsey 803). This social empiricism as Marx 
described it, is essentially what Edgar Huntly unconsciously gains during his wilderness 
adventure. Cropsey continues to describe Marx, 
 “increase in population at some point forced them to produce necessities and thereby to 
become distinguished from the beasts…man’s rationality or rather ‘consciousness’ is not 
fundamental but derivative…and the content of his reason must be determined by 
conditions external to his reason, conditions which are strictly material” (Cropsey 803). 
 Again, Edgar seems almost meant to awake in the cavern, stripped of his senses and facing a 
predatory beast to invoke his primitive nature and instantly dissolve the distinction between man 
and beast. Therefore, he emerges with a subtle change in his social perceptions, exemplified by 
his handling of the last Indian’s death, the switching of cultural weaponry and the action of 
leaving the musket as a grave marker for the Indian to represent a mortal comradery that extends 
beyond the social consciousness deriving from their respective ideological conditioning. That is, 






historical connotations, Brown includes the Scots-Irish in the symbolism of Edgar’s encounter 
with the dying “savage.” Brown’s veiled implication brought to a logical point of frankness is 
that capitalistic-materialistic competition causes their respective populations to believe they are 
constantly being threatened by the other, because ultimately they are all simply playing their part 
in a cyclical pattern that benefits the purveyors of idealism.  
If his goal is to subversively criticize latent tendencies of individualism in American 
politics and society for the contradiction to classical republicanism and the false idealism of 
respective partisan promises, it is clear why Brown’s American Gothic novels culminates with 
the re-telling of this particular timeline of Quaker-Irish relations. Specifically because, both the 
Scots-Irish immigrants and the Quakers migrated to America for idealistic, utopian hopes and 
whatever their ideological differences that kept them superficially opposed, this inherently 
individualistic floating promise of security and prosperity is applied successfully to both by 
institutional forces. The Quakers carried European ties to the English Crown through Willaim 
Penn himself, their journey to America was a spiritual one but finer details such as Penn’s land 
charter acquired from the king seems indicative of European imperialism and underlying 
commercial motivation. The Scots-Irish immigrants, mostly fleeing famine and their own 
political upheavals, embraced the classical republican ideal of civic virtue. During the revolution 
then it is somewhat appropriate the Scots-Irish readily join the revolutionaries, buying into the 
proclamation of classical republicanism because of the professed idea that if successful it would 
improve their situation. Having sided with the republican revolutionaries, the Scots-Irish social 
group gains temporary power over the Quakers in the implied social hierarchy—but also literally 
as the jailors of the famous Quaker exiles. And in the aftermath of the revolution, the Quakers 






Scots Irish rise as their ever-growing population expressed favor with Jeffersonian 
republicanism—specifically because of the association of the “promise of prosperity” with 
western expansion and settlement rather than with trade.1 All considered, they are simply, as 
Fisher Ames said of the entities on the larger political stage, taking their turns.2 
 
Part IV: Conclusion: Brown’s Underestimated Influence on Modernity  
 As Brown alludes to in Wieland, with its archetypal “sins of the father” theme, there is no 
Lockean fresh start to be had in America because American are not “starting fresh,” they are 
simply reinventing the Old-World, European model of governance. As the Marxist will point out 
where feudal and imperial Europe rule with repression, and the outright and blatant 
establishment of social barriers in reality, the modern states of the post-revolutionary era rule 
through ideology. Brown initially recognizes this hypocrisy in the expression of nascent 
ideological tendencies in early America and their transparent manifestation in partisan conflict. 
Scott Bradfield analyzes increasing transgressions in American Romance, “By presuming to 
transgress European laws and traditions, Americans acted out a story originally generated by 
class conflict in Europe…A story describing how humble, self-educated, underprivileged 
bourgeois men subvert aristocratic justice becomes translated into a story about transgressing 
foreign lands and people” (Bradfield xiii). Brown lays out this romantic methodology—already 
seeming to tend towards cultural dissatisfaction according to Bradfield—in Edgar Huntly with 
his opposition of frontiersmen and Indians, and his historical objectivity allows him to further 
this emerging American Romantic idiosyncrasy towards the gothic, as Scott Bradfield says, 
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making “political tropes into psychological ones,” and combing the Old-World European, the 
New-World idealistic American, and the defrauded Indians in this trans-Atlantic reproduction of 
class struggle. He first critiqued the prevalent political parties and their respective ideologies 
through allusions that revealed a shared kinship, but with the arena of social groupings at odds in 
Edgar Huntly and its historical allusions to more points of various social fracturing in the 
American reality, he is going deeper with his subversive tactics. The state of social relations and 
Edgar’s insights from his experience of “anti-enlightenment” in the wilderness suggests, through 
a breakdown of ideology, a validity to suspicions of self-serving or conspiratorial government 
policy on both sides of the partisan schism. He is going deeper with this subversion because 
Edgar’s change in feelings of hostility and vengeance as well as his sense of moral superiority 
from his experience invokes Cicero once again, bringing Brown’s gothic novels full-circle in 
theme. The allusion of Edgar’s subsequent lack of social animosity or exercising of distinction 
through differing value systems, is that his experience in the wilderness imparted upon him the 
Ciceronian sentiment, cui bono?1—“for whose benefit?” Once again incorporating the American 
historical breadth by indicting the present state of socio-political individualism, as he not only 
implies hypocrisy because of classical republicanism effecting the idealistic motivation of 
revolution, but questions the legitimacy of the revolution’s claim of public good.   
Brown offers critique and suspicions of the cultural identity of early America but does 
not offer a solution himself. Yet, for the first works of American Gothic it seems appropriate as 
American history will further unfold to indeed reveal a country that, while saying it is wholly 
individualistic would be obviously be an unfounded generalization, is of a capitalistic 
foundation. His work, which can be viewed as identifying proto-Marxist ideology, subverts 
                                                          






essentially through recognition of emergent capitalism. Therefore, although he does not offer 
direct solutions in his veiled social critique, his recognition of nascent contradictions in emergent 
capitalist thought anticipates generations of philosophical schools’ attempts at understanding the 
human condition in the modern age. 
  Richard Tarnas asserts that, “By all accounts the central prophet of the postmodern mind 
was Freidrich Nietzsche, with his radical persepctivism” (Tarnas 395), yet Brown, writing a 
century before Nietzsche and on a different continent no less, makes radical persepctivism the 
central theme amongst the plot’s historical subtext, or at least the central avenue of recognizing 
contradictions. Brown’s work is applicable to many lenses, and in this sense, his use of 
perspective anticipates both the modernists’ radical individualism and Nietzsche’s dark terms 
regarding this individualism. Tarnas says that with Nietzsche, “There is an appreciation of the 
plasticity and constant change of reality and knowledge, a stress on the priority of concrete 
experience over fixed abstract principles, and a conviction that no single a priori thought system 
should govern belief” (Tarnas 395). These specified principles seem parallel to the modernists’ 
aims of re-examination of society, which Brown also invokes in Wieland, by recalling of the 
early origins of European radical Protestantism, with Jakob Boehme’s “eternal dualism,” and 
therefore the philosophical reconciliation of the Elder Wieland’s “successful” combustion into 
divine fire—or to use the Quaker-seeking term, illumination—by embodying truth through his 
individualism, his unwillingness to join any sect that held institutional doctrine. Yet, the nature 
of the Elder Wieland’s demise on the hill of radical individualism is still given as a dark tale to 
the reader—though it seems nothing compared to Theodore’s death by blind faith in 
contradictory ideologies—and so one could say Brown anticipates modernist thought while 






finishes his summary of Nietzsche, “that the value of all truths and assumptions must be 
continually subjected to direct testing. The critical search for truth is constrained to be tolerant of 
ambiguity and pluralism and its outcome will necessarily be knowledge that is relative and 
fallible rather than absolute or certain” (Tarnas 396). This is wholly embodied by Brown’s 
giving Clara—“clear”—the distinct Cartesian expression of doubting and mistrusting the 
certainty of her senses or what the particulars of the landscape of a given situation connotes to 
her perspective and judgment. His characterization of Theodore Wieland as representative of 
these “pluralisms” through his expression of pure certainty in the truths he holds, and the 
outcome of Edgar Huntly’s journey through the sublime leaves him with a realization that his 
knowledge of the world and of society is “relative and fallible.” 
Brown’s use of objective and self-conscious history to subvert the crux of the early 
American identity—its idealism—lends to his exasperation with truths in general because, as is 
easily observable in his work, he uses a common Federalist critique of the Jeffersonians—that 
truths expressed in Jefferson’ sociopolitical environment were riddled with hypocrisies of 
historical ignorance—to subtly indict the Federalists of the same tendencies, thus highlighting 
the contradictory basis for ideologies in America. In subverting the American ideal of a fresh 
start, a clean break from Europe, he also subverts the American romantic sensibility of a place of 
picturesque and serene landscapes that invokes imagination not burdened by the cold and self-
serving European ways, by showing their historical kinship and in turn changing the American 
landscape from picturesque—which is an ideal and therefore controllable by a man—to the 
awesome sublime—in which man loses control and therefore loses humanity. This is the essence 
of the American Gothic and it translates to Roland Barthes take on the essence of 






system of meaning is a result of western’s philosophic and religious beliefs that they (and only 
they) embody the Truth” (Barthes 681). Barthes’ work, Mythologies was a grand work in the 
theory of poststructuralism, but Brown is, in a way, alluding to “mythologies” himself with his 
impossible critique of the historian, ever condemned to share the role of romancer. Barthes’ take 
on signification is that words in language “Share organizational capacity to describe something 
from different perspectives” (Mahbub 1), and therefore the forming of myth and the working of 
myth within society has everything to do with an influence of perspective, and subsequently, 
“these myths create class distinction and represent social functions and norms” (Mahbub 1). 
Take the example in Edgar Huntly of the intricate relationship symbolism between the Irish, the 
Indians, and the Quakers and its allusion to Brown’s present in the 1790s. He draws first on the 
history of how Quaker affiliates defrauded the Indians of land, sold the land to Irish 
frontiersmen, and then blamed the subsequent Indian attacks on the settlers’ own “drunkenness” 
and “wickedness,” then on the revolutionary Philadelphia when the Quakers were persecuted by 
the revolutionaries, who used the Irish immigrants as ready and willing militia-men, and finally 
on his present day when the Quakers are valued by a Federalist rather than Republican 
government for their ironically acquired skills in Indian peace negotiations and the continued 
influx of Irish immigrants to Philadelphia resulted in some to call them a “mob” and indeed 
reassert the term “savages.” He places all of this historical context into an ambiguous story that 
seems an amalgamation the events of the three historical periods in question, and brings them 
into the sublime wilderness, to the primitive, and the truly savage, where they are ultimately 
rendered irrelevant. The ironic trade-offs in roles between the three social classes or social 
groupings as history proceeds is being played upon by Brown here in the same sense of Barthes’ 






 In the second half of Edgar’s ordeal, when he has come down from the cavern, the 
change in his perspective made by the unraveling of relevancy or attachment to his ideals, 
implies another similar sentiment to Barthes in that myth, “is a system of communication” 
(Mahbub 2). That is to say, “pacifist” and “savage” are not just relative terms that serve a 
purpose, as the Marxist reading suggests, but they are words constructed by culture and society 
to convey meaning and therefore may be deconstructed through a radical perspective. Brown’s 
work, as it pertains to his use of this historical self-consciousness, is therefore working in some 
of ways of the poststructuralist: that is to say, he consolidates all of Western Civilization under 
one such “system of meaning,” which he unravels by taking Edgar out of Civilization and into 
the cavern. The allegorical setting of literal senselessness, of eye-opening helplessness and 
ultimately of basic primal survivalism, enables him to quite frankly state outright the 


















Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” The Norton Anthology of       
  Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., Norton and Company , 2010. 
 
Ames, Fisher. Dangers of American Liberty. “A Library of American Literature: An Anthology  
in Eleven Volumes.” Literature of the Republic, Part I., Constitutional period, 1788– 
1820 ed., IV, Stedman and Hutchinson, Comps. 
 
Appleby, Joyce, Capitalism and the New World Order: the Republican Vision of the 1790s. New  
York University Press. 19 
 
Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Points, 2014. 
Bradfield, Scott. “The Great Sea-Change: Edgar Huntely and the Transgression of Space.”  
Dreaming Revolution: Transgression in the Development, University of Iowa Press,  
1993. 
 
Bell, Michael David. "The Development of American Romance." Theory of the Novel. Ed. Michael  
McKeon. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2000. 
 
Boehme, Jakob. The Signature of All Things. The Luterworth Press, 2014. 
Brown, Charles Brockden. Wieland, or the Transformation. Hackett Publishing, 2009. 
Brown, Charles Brockden. Ormond, the Secret Witness. Crow Press, 2015.  
Brown, Charles Brockden. Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist: A Fragment. Crow Press, 2015. 
Brown, Charles Brockden. Edgar Huntly, or Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker. Hackett Publishing, 2006. 
Burke, Edmund, and L. G. Mitchell. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Oxford University  
Press, 2009. 
 
Canavan, Francis. “Thomas Paine.” History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., University of Chicago 
Press, 1987. 
 
Carson, James P. "Enlightenment, Popular Culture, and Gothic Fiction." The Cambridge  
Companion to the Eighteenth Century Novel, 1996. 
 
Churchman, John. An Account of the Gospel Labours, and Christian Experiences of a Faithful  
Minister of Christ, John Churchman, Late of Nottingham, in Pennsylvania, Deceased: to  
Which Is Added, a Short Memorial of the Life and Death of a Fellow Labourer in  
the Church, Our Valuable Friend Joseph White, Late of Bucks County.  
James Phillips, George-Yard, Lombard-Street, 1780. 
 
Cicero, Marcus. “CICERONIS PRO SEX. ROSCIO AMERINO ORATIO.” The Latin Library. Web.  
 
Coviello, Peter. “Agonizing Affection: Affect and Nation in Early America.” Early American  







De Tracy, Antoine Destutt. “A Treatise on Political Economy.” Liberty Fund, 2004. 
Gilpin, Thomas. Exiles in Virginia: with Observations on the Conduct of the Society of Friends during the  
Revolutionary War: Comprising the Official Papers of the Government Relating to That Period  
1777-1778. Heritage Books, 2002. 
 
Godwin, William. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Israel, Jonathan I. Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750.  
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Israt, Alam and Rifat Mahbub. “The Process of Signification on Today’s World: In the Light of  
Mythologies.” BRAC University, 2015. 
 
Jennings, Francis. The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: the Covenant Chain Confederation of  
Iroquois and with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744.  
Norton, 1984. 
 
Kamrath, Mark L. The Historicism of Charles Brockden Brown: Radical History and the Early  
Republic. Kent State University Press, 2010. 
 
 
Kafer, Peter. Charles Brockden Brown's Revolution and the Birth of the American Gothic.  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
 
Kennedy, Emmet. “‘Ideology’ from Destutt De Tracy to Marx.” Journal of the History of Ideas,  
vol. 40, no. 3, 1979 
 
Kerber, Linda K. Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America. Cornell  
University Press, 1983. 
 
Kramnick, Isaac. Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole.  
Cornell University Press, 1992. 
 
Kornfeld, Eve. “Crisis in the Capital: the Cultural Significance of Philadelphia’s Great Yellow  
Fever Epidemic.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, vol. 51, no.  
3, 1984, pp. 189–205. 
 
Lukács, Georg. “The Historical Novel.” Theory of the Novel, John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Mansfield, Harvey J. “Edmund Burke.” History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., University of Chicago
 Press, 1987. 
 
Marx, Karl. “The German Ideology.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism , 2nd ed., Norton
 and Company. 
 






1991): 39-57. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The Long Affair: Thomas Jefferson and the French Revolution. Sinclair- 
Stevenson, 1996. 
 
“Politics in Transition: Public Conflict in the 1790s.” U.S. History Online Textbook,  
Independence Hall Association. 
 
Reeder, Eastburn. Early Settlers of Solebury Township, Bucks County, Pa.: Compiled from  
Deeds, Wills and the Records of Friends' Meetings. The Intelligencer Company, 1900. 
 
Rogers, Paul C. “Villainy and the Fear of Conspiracy in Charles Brockden Brown's ‘Ormond.’”  
Early American Literature, vol. 15, no. 2, 1980, pp. 124–140. 
 
Strauss, Leo, and Joseph Cropsey. History of Political Philosophy. 3rd ed., University of  
Chicago Press, 1987. 
 







   
  
 
 
 
